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4 
Introduction 
 Why begin a discussion of themes of reference in Baudelaire and Mallarmé by 
mentioning Poe? For one because the first and second refer to the third. A simpler yet 
less obvious reason: Poe’s work teaches one how to read Baudelaire; this relationship 
then aids a reading of Mallarmé. One certainly has access to Baudelaire and Mallarmé 
without the aid of Poe, but a richer and fuller reading, a reading at once more focused and 
more expansive, can only be achieved having been firmly rooted in Poe’s work. The fact 
remains that while Poe never explicitly refers to Mallarmé or Baudelaire, the two refer to 
him explicitly and often.  
 Beginning with a discussion of Poe also involves making several key 
generalizations about all three poets. In as much as they – their works – refer to one 
another, they also resemble each other. This general resemblance offers a promising entry 
into the present inquiry. Poe, Baudelaire and Mallarmé each produced a significant body 
of critical work, regarded in each case as equal in importance to their creative output. 
Critical thinking was key to all three poets and as such often makes its way into their 
fiction and poetry. In all three, the line between creative and analytic is blurred. An 
understanding of their artistic output as inherently critical created by this blurring in fact 
broadens the importance of their art; a reciprocal understanding of their critical work as 
inherently artistic does the same.  
 While a potent blend of analytic and creative is by no means exclusive to these 
three poets, the particular circumstances of their textual relation lends itself to a vivid 
discussion of the ways in critical application of textual reference can dissect art – that is, 
analyze it – while at the same time illuminating it, outlining and exaggerating it, 
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enhancing it, pushing it beyond itself in search of itself. The result seems a unifying 
gesture, both scientific and beautiful. Yet in seeming unified this gesture will ironically 
render itself the opposite. When these texts seem to complete an understanding of each 
other, this essay suggests they do so by opening up the others to an infinity of possible – 
referential – meaning.  
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Chapter I 
Poe’s Farce 
 Being that the referentiality discussed above is inherently circular, I would 
suggest Poe’s work teaches one how to read Baudelaire’s as much as Baudelaire’s work 
teaches one how to read Poe’s. Baudelaire translated a great deal of Poe and while the act 
of translation is certainly a critical one, Baudelaire also produced a considerable amount 
of explicitly critical work regarding the subject of his translational enterprise. Three 
lengthy essays, “Edgar Allan Poe: Sa vie et ses ouvrages,” (1852) “Edgar Poe: Sa vie et 
ses œuvres,” (1856) and “Notes nouvelles sur Edgar Poe” (1857) in addition to several 
shorter notices attached to individual translations or letters comprise the body of this 
critical effort and it is with the third essay that the present discussion begins (Brix, 55-
56). I think the term “critical” an apt one because Baudelaire’s tone throughout this most 
critical of essays is not simply critical in a scientific or even structural sense. In fact, the 
idea of such a tone – or lack thereof – is something Baudelaire ardently criticizes in the 
essay. His personal tone is very much a tone (and very personal) in that it is deeply, 
emotionally critical. It is almost pained at times, hurt, sensitive, fraught with insecurity 
and beholden to an artistic ideality that is never not arresting in its conviction. It becomes 
apparent in the opening gesture of his essay that criticism is essentially an artistic – a 
beautiful – act for Baudelaire: “Littérature de décadence! — ” (Baudelaire, Notes 
nouvelles, 4) This is not a sentence; it is a gesture. Baudelaire literally points, toward a 
faction defined by those who choose to delimit literature (thereby limiting it) as such. But 
he does not do so objectively. This gesture is a criticism in that it literally criticizes in the 
derogatory, derisive, disdainful sense of the word. It separates and most importantly, it 
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valuates, that is, applies value. The italicization further imbues the sentence with a 
sardonic tone. This tone is important to the remainder of the sentence as well: “Paroles 
vides que nous entendons souvent tomber, avec la sonorité d’un bâillement emphatique 
[…]” (Baudelaire, 4). Note that these words are “heard,” their “sonority” an “emphatic 
yawn. This tone is thus aural, sonic; the words as gesture leave the page and are heard, 
gaining in dimensionality. What is more, the sardonic tone italicization creates further 
implies that these words are another’s, this other group defined in the same sentence as 
“ces sphinx sans énigme qui veillent devant les portes saintes de l’Esthétique classique” 
(Baudelaire, 4) Interesting that Baudelaire would begin his essay with a contemptuous 
quote, mocking the words of another. And yet it is a brilliant critical move. The critic’s 
work is understanding, and Baudelaire immediately and beautifully performs the act of 
understanding. He simultaneously (and thoroughly) seeks to understand what exactly is 
meant by those who use the term “littérature de décadence,” while imbuing the act of 
understanding with a fundamentally critical take on what he understands the phrase to 
mean.  
 Baudelaire both justifies and reinforces his disgust for those “critics” who pride 
themselves on an ability to discern what they deem to be true in art, which truth then 
becomes a kind of timeless “essence.” This essentializing viewpoint is an academic one, 
the academy in turn at the heart of Baudelaire’s evident disdain. In fact, his disgust 
appears almost a kind of pity, and in a tone of apparent conciliation, he offers “wise men” 
the benefit of the doubt: “Mais, pour laisser de côté les paraboles, je crois qu’il m’est 
permis de demander à ces hommes sages qu’ils comprennent bien toute la vanité, toute 
l’inutilité de leur sagesse” (Baudelaire, 5). The critical act – that is, the act of criticizing – 
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is once more revealed to allow understanding. The essentializing emphasis on truth is 
shown simultaneously to hinder actual understanding. Baudelaire is careful not to submit 
a merely different essence as truth, but rather to assert in these opening lines that any 
such generalization hinders access to beauty by foundering in a childish need for 
verification, that is, empirical evidence. Baudelaire valuates, he criticizes, but his 
valuation and criticism seek to highlight what is specific to criticism itself. Any attempt 
to unify theoretically and pass grand judgment represents a disaster as such. He goes on: 
“Le mot littérature de décadence implique qu’il y a une échelle de littératures, une 
vagissante, une puérile, une adolescente, etc. Ce terme, veux-je dire, suppose quelque 
chose de fatal et de providentiel, comme un décret inéluctable ; et il est tout à fait injuste 
de nous reprocher d’accomplir la loi mystérieuse” (Baudelaire, 5). A slightly more 
introspective tone inhabits these lines. Note that here Baudelaire examines the same 
phrase he tossed off so sardonically at the top of his essay, utilizing a more classically 
analytical vocabulary (“impliquer” for instance). He also rhetorically implies his own 
fallibility by correcting himself: “veux-je dire.” And yet, these lines accomplish a similar 
task to the opening. The word “décadence” becomes the troubling one. This is the word 
upon which Baudelaire’s disdainful reading hinges. It is the word that spurs on much of 
the essay. Baudelaire goes on to negate – that is, undo – the criticism this word implies 
by using precisely a critical approach..  
 How then does Edgar Poe factor into the critical undoing of decadence? Having 
established and fortified an initial other, Baudelaire makes the savvy critical move of 
introducing Poe in relief. Poe becomes a kind of hero, a fellow crusader, opposed to the 
theoretical Classicism against which Baudelaire rails in equal measure. And, as is 
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revealed over the course of the essay, an artist whose response to the criticism of 
decadence appears in solidarity with Baudelaire’s own. It would be difficult though to 
claim any direct influence in this regard. What is true is that the two artists employ 
similar means of subverting a common critically opposed and judgmentally suppressive 
establishment, an establishment that has deemed them both decadent. Important to an 
understanding of said means of subversion is the fact that Baudelaire does refer to Poe’s 
chosen subversive tactics as powerful and deserving of acclaim. Over the course of his 
essay he scrutinizes both Poe’s analytic and creative ouput, regarding the whole with a 
critical eye in order to claim its powerful – and subversive – success.  
 So from the mire of established explanatory modes – the doldrums of quotidian 
expression and the academy that seeks to institutionalize them as commonality – springs 
Poe: “Du sein d’un monde goulu, affamé de matérialités, Poe s’est élancé dans les rêves” 
(Baudelaire, 7). Once again, Baudelaire utilizes a particular kind of motion – note the 
fortitude and directionality of the verb “s’élancer” – that turns criticism into gesture. Poe 
is not merely a theoretical entity that textually inserts itself into Baudelaire’s debate. He 
darts, runs, throws himself from one world into another, entirely separate. The space 
traversed is dramatic and large. From the bosom of a world that revels in the sordid 
utilitarian, Poe moves toward dreams, presumably unbounded and revelatory, unlimited 
even. The contrast between material and dream worlds is made extremely stark by 
Baudelaire’s lengthy setup. And it is a dramatic setup. Drama resides at the heart of 
Baudelaire’s presentation. Poe becomes a hero figure in that he represents the critical 
opposition Baudelaire creates in his opening. The extent that the creation of a hero figure 
as part of Baudelaire’s criticism could be said to “moralize” the debate is irrelevant; as 
  
10 
will be shown later, Baudelaire’s appropriation of a moralizing tone in fact ironically 
undoes the established modes of criticism he seeks to criticize. This emergent irony is 
very important and will play a key roll going forward. Irony will in fact be key to 
understanding the work of Poe, Baudelaire and Mallarmé, as well as the relationships 
between these works.  
 Poe has emerged on the scene, seemingly triumphant, a hero. Yet his heroism is 
complicated by Baudelaire’s use of a series of epithets: first “caricature” (7), then 
“jongleur” (7) and “farceur” (7). These epithets can’t help but echo throughout the 
remainder of the essay, at which point they proceed to echo out across all of both Poe’s 
and Baudelaire’s work. They demand a critical reevaluation of the meaning of Poe’s 
work while simultaneously framing Baudelaire’s work within the context of his profound 
critical eye. That is to say, these epithets reveal Poe’s artistry while also underscoring the 
artistry of Baudelaire’s criticism. Further, these epithets are complicated because they 
avoid the kind of moralization toward which it seems Baudelaire is critically building. As 
has been mentioned, Baudelaire attempts to make Poe into a hero, yet at the apex of his 
expository chapter – concerning the emergence and movement of Poe-as-idea mentioned 
– Baudelaire undermines his entire argument by referring to Poe as something entirely 
different:  
Dans ce bouillonnement de médiocrités, dans ce monde épris des perfectionnements 
matériels, – scandale d’un nouveau genre qui fait comprendre la grandeur des 
peuples fainéants, – dans cette société avide d’étonnements, amoureuse de la vie, 
mais surtout d’une vie pleine d’excitations, un homme a paru qui a été grand, non-
seulement par sa subtilité métaphysique, par la beauté sinistre ou ravissante de ses 
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conceptions, par la rigueur de son analyse, mais grand aussi et non moins grand 
comme caricature.” (Baudelaire, 7) 
Rather than a hero, Poe is presented as caricature. The immediate opposition could not 
be starker. And yet it is precisely this dramatic opposition – the clash between 
expectation and reality, that is, buildup and delivery – that makes Poe’s heroism 
subversive, and which Baudelaire seeks to reveal. He is quick to clarify the intention of 
the provocative epithet: “ – Il faut que je m’explique avec quelque soin ; car récemment 
un critique imprudent se servait, pour dénigrer Edgar Poe et pour infirmer la sincérité de 
mon admiration, du mot jongleur que j’avais moi-même appliqué au noble poëte presque 
comme un éloge” (Baudelaire, 7). While this explanation does in fact clarify, it also 
further complicates. Yes, Baudelaire means only admiration in applying the term, but in 
addition to “caricature,” he further refers to Poe as a “juggler” – perhaps more generally, 
a “minstrel.” The drama of the situation seems only enhanced. Rather than a hero, 
Baudelaire has summoned forth what might be summed up best as an actor, that is, 
someone capable of performing caricature, minstrelsy, farce. For the caricature and 
minstrel are both defined by their ability to alter, to enhance in the sense of magnify, 
scrutinize. The caricature in fact criticizes; having deliberately chosen to augment 
features and diminish others, the caricature presents an opinion. The minstrel as metaphor 
is perhaps even more apt, for the emphasis on entertainment is clarified. Both the 
caricature and minstrel are intent on entertaining. They exploit humor in order to show 
the difference between what they are and what they signify. Baudelaire has one more 
important epithet for Poe, and its usage intensifies the complexity of his reading. In sum, 
says Baudelaire, “pour affirmer ma pensée d’une manière encore plus nette, Poe fut 
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toujours grand, non-seulement dans ses conceptions nobles, mais encore comme farceur” 
(Baudelaire, 7). Humor is thus shown to be key. Baudelaire locates Poe’s heroism, his 
genius, in his ability to joke, his manipulation of what Baudelaire deems essentially 
humorous. Contradiction abounds. Poe wrote next to nothing involving identifiable 
humor. His œuvre typifies the Gothic in literature, its ardent seriousness and stoicism 
regarded as stylistic hallmarks of the genre. Whence then this farce? What minstrel acts 
serious? What caricature remains stoic? Once again the moment of contradiction 
becomes the moment of critical revelation. Baudelaire suggests that in so much as Poe is 
a minstrel, he acts the very stoicism he typifies. Poe’s stylistic conceit thus caricatures the 
very modus operandi that is for Baudelaire “style.”  
 Perhaps Baudelaire’s epithet’s most profound implication is that Poe says one 
thing with the words in his work, yet with these words in fact means entirely another 
thing. That is, meaning in Poe’s work is inherently removed from that which his words 
signify. The idea of humor thus seems less farfetched, for just as the caricature derives its 
humorous effect from the dislocation of image from subject, and the minstrel body from 
gravity or physical limitation, so too Poe’s prose will be shown to evoke subtle humor by 
dislocating its meaning from the words presented. In this ability to say one thing while 
implying another, Baudelaire defines Poe’s genius, his heroism. This genius thus 
represents a kind of subversion, for by calling Poe a “jongleur” “presque comme un 
éloge,” Baudelaire acknowledges the ability of Poe’s genius to critique an aesthetic 
establishment from within the confines of that establishment. Baudelaire’s epithets 
appear yet more apt. How better to show what is ridiculous about a costume than by 
sporting it for all to witness? Yet key to revealing the ridiculous is the act of sporting the 
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costume in the first place. Baudelaire’s measly “farceur” appears the hero for which he 
sought initially once more. Poe’s heroism is indeed his subtlety. In using contradiction to 
define Poe, Baudelaire artfully performs the contradiction that makes Poe great. This 
contradiction will be shown shortly in relation to a poem of Poe’s. 
 Yet the question poses itself: what constitutes the aesthetic establishment – the 
silly costume – against which Baudelaire rails? Key to his critical reliance on Poe is the 
fact that this establishment is inherently American: 
“Jeune et vieille à la fois, l’Amérique bavarde et radote avec une volubilité 
étonnante. Qui pourrait compter ses poëtes ? Ils sont innombrables. Ses bas-
bleus ? Ils encombrent les revues. Ses critiques ? Croyez qu’elle possède des 
pédants qui valent bien les nôtres pour rappeler sans cesse l’artiste à la beauté 
antique, pour questionner un poëte ou un romancier sur la moralité de son but et la 
qualité de ses intentions.” (Baudelaire, 7) 
Baudelaire uses rhetorical repetition to show the continuity and pervasiveness of the 
American pressure on poetry: note his repeated use of punchy questions. He shows 
America to be a place inherently hostile to poetry. Later in his essay, if not necessarily 
American in physical composition, the same establishment is shown to be deeply aligned 
with that which America represents for Baudelaire. He refers to this American quality as 
a sickness, using the neologism “l’americanomanie” (Baudelaire, 16). This term is 
interesting because it represents a fascination with America while also subtly suggesting 
the very qualities that make it so dangerous. Chief among these are an emphasis on 
entertainment, an infantile desire for proof, and a respect for the virtue of utility above all 
else. “L’americanomnie” thus refers both to the infectious inability to tear oneself from 
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America – he refers to it as “un passion de bon temps” (16) – and the cult of image 
America as nation prizes in itself above all else. Baudelaire goes on an on, criticizing the 
nation’s inherent hypocrisy, its mediocrity and its utter fascination with itself. For the 
nation with the most potent case of “americanomanie” is of course America itself. Again 
Poe emerges as the one artist capable of removing himself from the present squalor. Yes, 
Poe is idealistic; his own critical output often appears almost Platonic in conception – 
think of “The Poetic Principle” or “The Philosophy of Composition,” both of which will 
be discussed at length.  
 Yet according to Baudelaire, Poe’s most effective means of suggesting the artistic 
ideal he conceptualizes constitutes an undoing from within, rather than any kind of 
rejection of removal. This undoing relies upon the use of that which Baudelaire refers to 
as “imagination.” In a particularly moving passage, he defines imagination as he 
understands it in Poe’s case:  
“Pour lui, l’Imagination est la reine des facultés ; mais par ce mot il entend 
quelque chose de plus grand que ce qui est entendu par le commun des lecteurs. 
L’Imagination n’est pas la fantaisie ; elle n’est pas non plus la sensibilité, bien 
qu’il soit difficile de concevoir un homme imaginatif qui ne serait pas sensible. 
L’Imagination est une faculté quasi divine qui perçoit tout d’abord, en dehors des 
méthodes philosophiques, les rapports intimes et secrets des choses, les 
correspondances et les analogies. ” (Baudelaire, 17-18) 
 The divinity of imagination is a beautiful thought, and key to the internal undoing of a 
system described by Baudelaire as defined by belief. Be it in God or science, the desire to 
locate thoughts, opinions and theories within the shadowy framework of belief could be 
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said to constitute that which disgusts Baudelaire about America, that is, the essence of the 
framework against which he – along with Poe – pits himself. Imagination for Poe thus 
constitutes the space beyond belief, its divinity precisely that which keeps it from the 
clutches of our pitiful human “understanding,” our need to define and categorize. 
Baudelaire lashes out equally against the rapacious American thirst for progress, be it 
social or scientific. He sees this progress as anything but, and in fact associates it with a 
civil decrepitude, a destruction of humanity in favor of the false divinity of the 
measurable. Imagination lies beyond even philosophical methods, which Baudelaire 
again allies with the kind of scientific savagery that seeks only to diminish by explaining. 
Elsewhere he defines philosophy coyly as “une manière à eux de nier ce qui est et 
d’expliquer ce qui n’est pas” (Baudelaire, 11). Philosophy thus misses the point by 
disregarding what there in fact is. Imagination could then be understood (although any 
attempt to define it might seem, in line with Baudelaire’s criticism, an ensuing act of 
reduction) as that which enhances what is, the network of “correspondences and 
analogies” that links all things. These links are “intimate and secret” in that, much to the 
dismay of the American sensibility, they cannot be shown, they cannot be proven, nor 
can they be utilized. They are in a word beautiful.  
 Baudelaire relies heavily (to the point of plagiarism) on a critical essay of Poe’s 
entitled “The Poetic Principle,” which I will refer to in greater detail momentarily. 
Baudelaire finds abundant merit in the essay and points to its thesis as the heart of his 
own conception of poetry: “La poésie ne peut pas, sous peine de mort ou de défaillance, 
s’assimiler à la science ou à la morale ; elle n’a pas la Vérité pour objet, elle n’a qu’Elle-
même” (Baudelaire, 24). Similar to the discussion of imagination above, poetry for 
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Baudelaire is utterly incapable of use. It can never refer away from itself, can never show, 
prove, describe, define, point, or do. It simply is itself, inhabiting that secret, intimate 
space between things that cannot be objectified. Truth again returns as adversary, and 
Baudelaire’s critical tone remains as potent as ever. Truth as essence is shown to be 
limiting, to constrict what need not be fettered. A desire for truth, suggests Baudelaire – 
and Poe – is in fact a limiting desire. In reference to the imagination mentioned above, 
Baudelaire evokes a kind of communication with the “splendeurs situées derrière le 
tombeau” (Baudelaire, 25): “La soif insatiable de tout ce qui est au delà, et que révèle la 
vie, est la preuve la plus vivante de notre immortalité” (Baudelaire, 24). Note that in 
describing a conception of death, Baudelaire evokes “prevue […] vivante.” The 
contradiction is striking: that which enhances life, makes it unending, in fact involves an 
imaginary leap “beyond the tomb.” Imagination thus appears to encompass that which is 
unimaginable – that which is simply “au delà” – and herein lies the beauty of the term 
itself. For once again, the term as a word takes on poetical significance by suggesting 
that which it logically delimits. The afterlife is theoretically inaccessible, its boundaries 
the sheer limits of human cognition and mortality. The word itself permits access to that 
which science could not possibly feign to prove.  
 Baudelaire locates Poe’s power to conjure imagination in his formal application 
of brevity. This brevity is as much a sign of Poe the “farceur” as Poe the artist. In the 
“nouvelle,” or short story, a genre Poe‘s work defines, Baudelaire recognized a 
subversive genius unparalleled (or perhaps paralleled only by himself). Again referring to 
“The Poetic Principle,” Baudelaire notes how Poe’s manipulation of length permits the 
presence of imagination by controlling the volume of words. As a caricature, the short 
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story refers humorously to that which it is not, namely a long story. It defies essence by 
referring constantly away from itself. The intimate spaces between the words, the 
“correspondence and analogy” they provoke, thus become more meaningful. Of course, 
adds Baudelaire, the short story inevitably fails to evoke said spaces, because doing so is 
the realm of “pure poetry” (Bauelaire, 19). Yet in eschewing the formal characteristics of 
poetry, the short story in fact shows itself to comment critically on poetry’s very nature. 
Baudelaire says as much when he writes: “Mais ce sont des luttes et des efforts qui ne 
servent qu’à démontrer la force des vrais moyens adaptés aux buts correspondants, et je 
ne serais pas éloigné de croire que chez quelques auteurs, les plus grands qu’on puisse 
choisir, ces tentations héroïques vinssent d’un désespoir” (Baudelaire, 19). The “true 
means” – a contradiction in terms, as these are the very words that earlier digust 
Baudelaire – referred to here is poetry. And it is, as Baudelaire states, the performative 
nature of the short story’s ultimate failure to adequately inspire imagination that makes it 
so important to a subversion of the aforementioned aesthetic establihment. Key here is 
that Baudelaire is suggesting Poe’s short fiction self-consciously refers to its own failure, 
that is, the fact that it isn’t poetry. Thus “imagination” here involves the subtle, intimate 
correspondence between fiction and poetry. The comparison – the contradiction – is 
forced formally, thus becoming the subversive force so admired by Baudelaire. 
 And yet, Baudelaire at times doubts the very subversive force he seems to 
otherwise ardently admire. In a brief discussion of another critical essay of Poe’s entitled 
“The Philosophy of Composition” (which will also be discussed later), Baudelaire seems 
to at last find fault with the very hero he’s praised: “Bien des gens, de ceux surtout qui 
ont lu le singulier poëme intitulé Le Corbeau, seraient scandalisés si j’analysais l’article 
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où notre poëte a ingénument en apparence, mais avec une légère impertinence que je ne 
puis blâmer, minutieusement expliqué le mode de construction qu’il a employé […]” 
(Baudelaire, 25). Most interesting is that Baudelaire refers to Poe’s systematic 
explanation of creative method in his most famous poem “The Raven” by adding that it is 
not without a “une légère impertinence que je ne puis blâmer.” The word “impertinence” 
makes this seem at once a critical jab, an admonition, as if to say, “don’t go there…” And 
yet Poe’s willingness to display said impertinence still deserves respect; note that 
Baudelaire “cannot blame” this impertinence. By acknowledging the audacity of Poe’s 
impertinence, he belies his own admiration. Poe’s “impertinence” is first the subversion 
of artistic inspiration; it is a calculus of creativity. Yet its calculus also ironically 
performs the subversion of the troublesome “americanomanie” it exists as part of, the 
same “americanomanie” Baudelaire derides in his essay.  
 As will be shown, the mathematical efficiency of Poe’s self-exegesis in the essay 
employs the scientific, methodological vocabulary that Baudelaire chastises. And yet the 
formal, theoretical appropriation of such methods in the hands of Poe, Baudelaire 
acknowledges, does not represent a concession. Rather, Poe appropriates the scientific 
method in order to show its ultimate failure. He dawns the scientific costume as 
caricature in order to parody it. Here is Poe as “farceur” at his best. The essay is 
extremely serious in tone, both thoughtful and self-confident, yet it strives in terms 
utterly removed from the poetical to capture precisely that which might best be defined as 
Baudelaire’s “imagination.” The failure of the essay is subtle, yet it is impossible to 
ignore. Baudelaire suggests Poe is impertinent for even attempting such a silly task: 
identifying the mechanism of the poetic imagination. The contradiction between 
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bombastic tone and futile task, the opposition of façade and content, ushers in a humor 
associated with irony.  
 Rather than jump immediately into the pertinent fiction of Poe, this essay will first 
take a detour through more of Poe’s critical work, an understanding of which has been 
broadened by examination of its interpretation in Baudelaire, discussed supra. The 
critique in question is Poe’s “The Poetic Principle,” to which Baudelaire refers 
extensively in his “Notes nouvelles sur Edgar Poe.” His reference is thorough in that he 
quotes the essay extensively, but he occasionally does little more than translate it. 
Whether this constitutes plagiarism is perhaps unimportant. Baudelaire’s careful attention 
to Poe’s essay means that an essay about the referential space between the two authors 
had better consider this essay in some detail. Startling about “The Poetic Principle” is that 
it appears to contradict itself. Simply put, Poe states a claim, but then at the conclusion of 
his essay, opposes it with another. How then to understand the essay’s conclusion, and 
what to make of this act of understanding? The essay opens with a discussion of length as 
it pertains to poetry. Poe criticizes the conception of the poetic as necessarily “epic” and 
in fact advances the notion that an “epic poem” is in fact not a poem (Poe, Critical 
Theory, 197). At best it is perhaps a series of linked poems. The poetic “excitement” 
(179) thus derives from a poem’s consciousness of its own formal existence. It is the 
poem itself that defines what is poetic, not the “Quarterly Reviews” (179) that, much like 
Baudelaire, Poe criticizes as a general bastion of aesthetic dogma. He defines such 
thought as perpetuating the “heresies of the Didactic” (182) – what Baudelaire calls 
“l’hérésie de l’enseigement” (NN, 35) – and goes on to set up the very same dichotomy 
as Baudelaire between “Poetry and Truth” (P, 183). And much like Baudelaire, he 
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suggests the ultimate domain of the poetic to be neither more nor less than poetry itself: 
“there neither exists nor can exist any work more thoroughly dignified, more supremely 
noble, than this very poem, this poem per se, this poem which is a poem and nothing 
more, this poem written solely for the poem's sake” (182). Like Baudelaire again, he 
recognizes a modern propensity – an American propensity – to consider a poem “good” – 
successful – in that it perpetuates some moral end, that is, inculcates Truth:  
“It has been assumed, tacitly and avowedly, directly and indirectly, that the 
ultimate object of all Poetry is Truth. Every poem, it is said, should inculcate a 
moral, and by this moral is the poetical merit of the work to be adjudged. We 
Americans especially have patronized this happy idea, and we Bostonians very 
especially have developed it in full.” (182)  
And yet, the poetical realm lies beyond such utilitarian necessity. It is rooted in 
Baudelaire’s “divine imagination,” that is, the point at which comprehension fails and 
subtle interactions and correspondences take over: “The struggle to apprehend the 
supernal Loveliness- this struggle […] has given to the world all that which it (the world) 
has ever been enabled at once to understand and to feel as poetic” (184). Inherent in the 
“poetic” is an inability to understand, the so-called “struggle to apprehend.” This inability 
fundamentally defies a relentless progress of scientific thought based on the notion of 
limitlessness of human propensity for comprehension. That which cannot be understood, 
suggests Poe, is actually the most important. This conclusion evokes Mallarmé, who, in 
“Le Mystère dans le lettres,” suggests similarly that a poem’s real meaning exists around 
and below it, in the “blanc” around the word, or the “cul-de-lampe invisible” under the 
text (M, 288).  
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 Truth, suggests Poe, is still accessible, only the means of access are opposite: “In 
enforcing a truth we need severity rather than efflorescence of language. We must be 
simple, precise, terse. We must be cool, calm, unimpassioned. In a word, we must be in 
that mood which, as nearly as possible, is the exact converse of the poetical” (183). 
Notice that truth here is “enforced.” It is not shown, nor is it tested or proven. “Severity” 
is key. Truth exists in diametric opposition to the poetical in that truth is useful. This is an 
extremely interesting and fundamentally jarring understanding of the term “truth,” and 
important here is that only through defining that which truth is not – that is, poetry – can 
the nature of “truth” as concept be grasped. Truth appears here the result of mere 
rhetorical emphasis. It is in fact the instrument of rhetoricians, those who use words in 
order to accomplish tasks. Clarity is their goal, clarity being simply the absence of poetry.  
 And yet the conclusion of the essay is thus confounding in the extreme. Poe 
begins an extensive paragraph with a litany of those things he understands as inducing “in 
the Poet himself the true poetical effect” (198). What to make of a poetical effect that is 
indeed “true”? Whence this “truth” that seems to magically insert itself? Can “truth” thus 
be shown to be subverted, its meaning incontrovertibly multiplied? Poe does offer 
reconciliation:  
“And in regard to Truth – if, to be sure, through the attainment of a truth, we are 
led to perceive a harmony where none was apparent before, we experience, at 
once, the true poetical effect – but this effect is referable to the harmony alone, 
and not in the least degree to the truth which merely served to render the harmony 
manifest” (198).  
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Poe here contradicts himself while reveling in his apparent contradiction. As Baudelaire 
suggests, Poe can here be understood as purposefully contradicting himself in order to aid 
his critical approach. The Truth initially definable in terms of its opposition to poetry is 
here subsumed in order to more adequately define that which is in effect poetical. Poe 
cannot avoid suggesting that although inherently opposed, the poetic must use what he 
deems “true” in order to undo a conception of Truth as driven by an aforementioned 
moralistic compulsion. The essay’s final paragraph constitutes an extremely moving 
testament to the beauty resulting from the contradiction he engenders. It constitutes not 
only a litany of those things he deems “true” poetical impulses, but a performance of the 
poetry conjured by manipulating Truth. The result is imagination employed. These 
evocative lines form a quasi-prose-poem, their genre-bending conclusion paving the way 
for a critical look at a specific nouvelle of Poe’s. 
 “The Imp of the Perverse” appears to immediately and utterly oppose itself to all 
that Poe defines in “The Poetic Principle” as beautiful – recall the “supernal Lovliness” 
we all “struggle to apprehend” (P, 184). And yet, it attains beauty provoking the same 
imagination Poe’s “struggle” does, Baudelaire argues this when he discusses “divine 
imagination” (B, 17) regarding Poe’s nouvelles: “Il est un point par lequel la nouvelle a 
une supériorité, même sur le poëme. […] les artifices du rythme sont un obstacle 
insurmontable à ce développement minutieux de pensées et d’expressions qui a pour 
objet la vérité” (19-20) Note that even in this quest for “la vérité,” Poe’s nouvelles exhibit 
“une supériorité.” “The Imp of the perverse” is thus a prime example of what precisely 
makes Poe a genius “farceur.” His ability to criticize a costume by donning it elicits 
Baudelaire’s sincere admiration.  
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 “The Imp of the Perverse” can be seen as a template for many of Poe’s more well-
known stories. Much like “The Black Cat” or “The Tell-tale Heart,” “The Imp of the 
Perverse” involves a curious and irrational impulsion to ultimate self-undoing. “The Imp 
of the Perverse” is an interesting case, though, because it remains a more general account, 
following the same basic plot structure as the others, only without the artful narrative 
focus that has earned them renown. In fact, the story begins in a state of description 
entirely removed from narrative. Its opening constitutes a kind of metaphysical 
meditation, and indeed appears sincerely philosophical in character. Its grammatical 
subject is a general first person, or an impersonal third. It resists all narrative pretension; 
it in fact defies fictional intent. Upon reading the opening of the story, one does not 
presume to have begun a story at all. This false opening is also key to the story’s ultimate 
conclusion. Rather than tell, this opening explains. Interesting of course that a narrative 
should commence with explanation; nothing has yet happened for a narrator to explain. 
And yet grounding the story’s irrational content in carefully established rationality 
artfully sets up the story’s brilliantly macabre – and irrational – conclusion.  
 “The Imp” takes a turn toward narrative when an intimate first person address 
jumps from philosophical obscurity at the reader: “I have said thus much, that in some 
measure I may answer your question, that I may explain to you why I am here, that I may 
assign to you something that shall have at least the faint aspect of a cause for my wearing 
these fetters, and for my tenanting this cell of the condemned” (Poe, The Complete 
Stories, 858). Not only has the shapeless author of the opening suddenly taken form 
(human) and location (prison), a reader is also intimately addressed. In addition, this 
presumed reader is presumed to have spoken, to have engaged conversationally with the 
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fettered narrator. Suddenly, shockingly, within a mere sentence, an entire narrative has 
sprung up, and not simply contained within said sentence, but suggested by it. Most of 
this sentence’s considerable action has taken place beyond its small confines. This 
sentence is genius, and illuminates Poe as “farceur” immediately. For within this one 
sentence, the reader – not to mention the story itself – becomes fully and viscerally aware 
of all the delicate machinations of the fictive process that have been put to work creating 
this very moment. The genius of the moment is that it reveals while doing. It is thus 
critical of the fictive act while managing to maintain the fictive coherence necessary to 
extending a narrative and telling a story. In that it moves beyond itself, inhabiting those 
secret spaces between its words, this sentence attains what Baudelaire and Poe attribute 
almost exclusively to poetry: beauty.  
 Yet here again, contradiction abounds. In line with Poe’s thesis in “The Poetic 
Principle,” that which is true is only so as a result of its cold, measured, mathematical 
enforcement. The appeal to philosophical rationality that opens the story can be seen at 
once as both reinforcing Truth in a general sense, and creating the fictive mode of truth 
that the story will in the end move to corrupt. Question being: how can a sentence that 
appears upon examination to have attained a level of beauty remain couched in the 
calculated establishment of truth? Further examination is warranted. The narrator, with 
whom a reader has established an extensive, intimate relationship, continues to narrate, 
describing in relative detail the disturbing circumstances that culminated in his present 
imprisonment. Yet the machinations of fiction begin again to reveal themselves from 
beneath their façade. If, as the narrator suggests, he is telling a reader his story, who has 
written it down? If, as he ends his story, he will find himself tomorrow in a ghostly 
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elsewhere, what is a reader (or listener) to make of his story’s perpetual redoing? The 
narrator’s direct and profoundly intimate address appears at once utterly true. It pretends 
in every way to that ultimate Truth which Poe pits against Poetry in his essay. And yet 
the very nature of its fictional form reveals the pretense of truth to be just that – a 
pretense. By the same token, truth here is also shown to be a fictive device. Its use reveals 
Poe’s critical intention, elevating the story to that plane of the “divine imaginary” 
suggested by Baudelaire. In criticizing its own insistence upon truth, the story invites an 
ironic reading of itself, elevating itself to (equating itself with?) poetic beauty.  
 Further, the insistence upon rationality evinced by the story’s self-consciously 
“prolix” (Poe, 858) opening serves to contradict the fundamentally irrational nature of the 
“Perverse.” In fact, despite its rationality, the opening succeeds only in defining 
perversity as that which isn’t rational. And yet the story formally and rhetorically 
appropriates rationality in order to suggest the irrational. Once again, Poe’s propensity for 
caricature emerges: the irrational appropriates the guise – in this instance linguistic – of 
the rational in order to mock it. The rational is thus emphasized, ballooned. The opening 
is indeed “prolix” to the point of bombast. Whether or not it in fact means anything is 
redundant. Its meaning is as much formal as topical. Of course, the insistence upon a 
moral ir/rationality is something to note. The moral sense as compass is destabilized by 
the story, much as an essential conception of Truth is destabilized by the failure of the 
story’s fictive form to be objectively “true.” In the moral absence that is this “Perverse,” 
morals themselves are shown to be defined as much by their lack as by their presence. 
With Poe’s essay in mind, the question of a “useful” fiction recalls itself. In “The Imp of 
the Perverse,” any moral agenda is deliberately upended, yet, as Baudelaire suggests 
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when he calls Poe a “jongleur,” the upending of this agenda is performed – juggled, so to 
speak – as much as it is referred to. The story’s very creation pushes habits ordained by 
morality to their limit in order to question them. To use an earlier metaphor: it criticizes 
morals by donning them as costume, thereby revealing them to be no more than costume. 
Although the events detailed never took place, they claim to have done so, which claim is 
destabilizing in the extreme. The story itself eggs on those in search of simple 
“verification” – in Baudelaire’s words: “ô vérificateurs de ce qui ne peut pas être 
vérifié !” (Baudelaire, 8) – by tempting them to search for what inevitably is not there. 
Thus fiction, through its failings, permits access to that “imaginary,” which, in the case of 
the moral, reveals the very structure of things – their contingency.  
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Chapter II 
 
Baudelaire’s Critique 
 
The above reading of Poe’s “The Imp of the Perverse” suggests that the text not only 
permits but encourages an ironic reading of itself. The story’s final moments, when the 
text reveals its truth to be simply the illusion of truth – when it enacts truth in so doing – 
are most pertinent here as they pertain to the following discussion of Baudelaire. Another 
reading of Poe’s text as moral critique was described, and will also be engaged as 
pertaining to Baudelaire’s poetry. The text’s ironic self-understanding in fact enacts its 
moral critique; this relationship is pertinent to understanding Baudelaire as well. 
.  Earlier it was claimed that the irony elicited by Poe’s text’s self-reference was 
precisely what elevated it to the poetical plane of the beautiful, leading Baudelaire to 
praise it so. As was also suggested earlier and will be shown in more detail, the “utility” 
of a text wedded to morally ordained realism disgusts Baudelaire. Such a text refuses to 
titillate the mind, to provoke what he refers to as the “divine imaginary,” the ability of 
thought to physically transport a reader. This in mind, it seems like “The Imp of the 
Perverse” would be of little interest to Baudelaire. As shown, it revels in the real, 
fetishizing as it were the semblance of truth by appropriating different stylistic turns: the 
appearance of philosophical discourse, professorial declamation, last will and testament, 
confessional statement, diary entry, intimate address. These rhetorical styles are 
important because they convey truth, and are employed as such. But they are also 
exaggerated in turn, which exaggeration Poe uses to subvert the “truth” they claim. 
 Where is the origin of Baudelaire’s admittedly non-obvious admiration for such 
ardent and seemingly heartfelt truthful proclamations located? Yet the origin is just there, 
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in the sentence immediately proceeding this one: “seemingly.” In his “Notes nouvelles,” 
Baudelaire presents the future reader of Poe with a word of caution: this man does not 
mean what he says; he revels in farce: “[…] Poe fut toujours grand, non-seulement dans 
ses conceptions nobles, mais encore comme farceur” (Baudelaire, 7). The truth of Poe’s 
tone in “The Imp of the perverse” is so true – painfully so – that it creates the presence of 
falsehood. That is, the untruth of the story – its logical impossibility – is revealed through 
the trueness of the story itself. The story is its own undoing, its own defamation, and 
most importantly its own critique. Here is the origin of Baudelaire’s admiration. For a 
story that is critical of itself, that admonishes its own power, that reveals only the art of 
the fictive, is a story that approaches the beauty of the poetical. When words are given 
double meaning – a plurality of reference – they cease to remain within the mundane and 
task-oriented world of definition and move stealthily into the sublime mode of the 
poetical. Thus their referentiality is also ironical. Interesting also that within an essay that 
vilifies the then-current status of discourse both critical and popular – recall the “sphinx 
sans énigme” (Baudelaire, 4) that begin his “Notes nouvelles”1 – Baudelaire should so 
heartily laud an author for the self-critical capacity of his work.  
 That said, both authors had their own critical streaks. Poe’s “The Poetic Principle” 
is evidence of this streak, like Baudelaire’s “Notes nouvelles.” Yet in “The Poetical 
Principle,” Poe defines poetry by its reliance on the very “truth” both he and Baudelaire 
criticize: “And in regard to Truth – if, to be sure, through the attainment of a truth, we are 
                                                
1 Or this lick from the same: “Combien eût-il ri, de ce rire méprisant du poëte qui ne grossit 
jamais la grappe des badauds, s’il était tombé, comme cela m’est arrivé récemment, sur cette 
phrase mirifique qui fait rêver aux bouffonnes et volontaires absurdités des paillasses, et que j’ai 
trouvée se pavanant perfidement dans un journal plus que grave : Le progrès incessant de la 
science a permis tout récemment de retrouver le secret perdu et si longtemps cherché de… (feu 
grégeois, trempe du cuivre, n’importe quoi disparu), dont les applications les plus réussies 
remontent à une époque barbare et très-ancienne !” (Baudelaire, 11-12) 
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led to perceive a harmony where none was apparent before, we experience, at once, the 
true poetical effect […]” (Poe, 198). This reliance, though, is ultimately self-critical. The 
utilization of truth as poetic device is what permits a subversion of the moralistic “truth” 
Baudelaire disdains for its very utility. Baudelaire admires Poe’s essay – and quotes it so 
thoroughly – because it functions by revealing the same “truth” to have been used. So 
“The Poetic Principle” performs the very transformation it describes, turning statements 
of fact – truth – into acts of displacement: beauty creeps in where before there was none. 
Truth is not “simple, precise, terse […] cool, calm, unimpassioned” (Poe, 183), but 
merely the form rhetoric takes to convey an image as such. Thus Baudelaire reveals Poe 
to be above all else an author capable of meaning other than what it is he writes. Such 
double meaning is the seat of irony.  
 While this might not initially appear a compliment, Baudelaire means it as one of 
the most profound sort, and it is this quality above all others that, for Baudelaire, makes 
Poe a poet of the first. But these questions then present themselves: why did Baudelaire 
go to such great lengths to compliment a (deceased) colleague? Why attempt to explain 
the ironic value of an œuvre also successfully operative on fundamentally simpler – or 
rather, less ironic – fictive levels? Why put so much effort into what effectively became a 
monopoly over the reception of Poe’s work in France?2 Baudelaire’s correspondence 
reveals vacillation in his stance on Poe, as in this letter to Mme Paul Meurice, dated 
February 18th, 1865:  “Je regarde les traductions comme un moyen paresseux de battre 
monnaie” (Brix, 59). What is more, Baudelaire’s translations of Poe’s short stories 
                                                
2 Consider Michel Brix’s interesting interpretation: “Baudelaire, qui s'était fait en France le 
spécialiste de Poe, ne pouvait déconsidérer publiquement celui-ci sans mettre en cause l'intérêt de 
son travail, et donc ne disposait plus, pour la critique, d'une entière liberté de parole.” (Brix, 59) 
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remained a primary source of income throughout his life.3 This essay suggests, though, 
that Baudelaire’s writings themselves reveal the complexity of this stance. To answer the 
questions posed, this essay claims the extent of Baudelaire’s critical and translational 
attention to Poe’s writings shows his reliance on them. Further, Baudelaire devoted 
himself to disseminating Poe’s writings because he considered them necessary to a 
general comprehension of his own work. Baudelaire’s critical attention to Poe and his 
dissemination of Poe’s work in translation suggest an attempt to prime an audience for 
learned access to his own artistic endeavor. His condemnation of poetry’s then-current 
critical discourse shows he understood such learned access to be widely unavailable. The 
subtle nature of his critical insight into Poe and the fact that this insight is framed as a 
compliment create an explanatory key that opens a richer reading of Poe. This richer 
reading could then be used to access Baudelaire’s own loftier, more erudite poetry. As a 
foreword to his translations of Poe’s nouvelles, Baudelaire’s “Notes nouvelles” becomes 
a kind of gauntlet: “if you have read my “Notes” and understand them,” Baudelaire is 
imagined adding, “you may proceed to Poe, and then perhaps to my own work….” The 
line between gauntlet and instructional manual is fine, though, and one that Baudelaire of 
course never consciously acknowledges. The essay’s own explanation is certainly erudite 
in the extreme. Yet it also remains a general critique, and interestingly refrains from 
illustrating its most subtle claim – that Poe was at every turn joking, that he meant other 
than what he wrote – with direct textual allusion to Poe’s fiction. Baudelaire reserves this 
illustration for his own creative work. His critique of Poe’s work does not take place in 
                                                
3 Again, Brix: “Jusqu'aux rachats des droits par Michel Lévy, le 1er novembre 1863, les 
traductions de Poe — qui étaient payées à Baudelaire par son éditeur mais également par les 
directeurs des journaux où elles paraissaient en préoriginales — ont constitué pour 
l'écrivain français sa seule source de revenus réguliers.” (Brix, 59) 
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the essay; rather, it is performed within his poetry itself, complicating a poetry that, it will 
be claimed, already operates with respect to an intrinsic irony cultivated through self-
referentiality. Poe’s “The Imp of the Perverse” was discussed so as to illustrate this point. 
A poem of Baudelaire’s – “Le Mauvais vitrier” – may be fruitfully understood as 
precisely the critique-in-poetry just described. As will be shown, it is both directly and 
indirectly an analysis of Poe’s “The Imp of the Perverse.” 
 Whether or not Baudelaire read Poe’s “The Imp of the Perverse” before writing 
his own “Le Mauvais vitrier” is inconsequential. That said, moments in Baudelaire’s 
correspondence suggest that the nature of his textual relation to Poe was questioned 
following the publication of his translations. In the same letter to Mme Meurice 
mentioned earlier, Baudelaire writes: “J'ai perdu beaucoup de temps à traduire Edgar Poe, 
et le grand bénéfice que j'en ai tiré, c'est que quelques bonnes langues ont dit que j'avais 
emprunté à Poe mes poésies, lesquelles étaient faites dix ans avant que je connusse les 
œuvres de ce dernier” (Brix, 57). The nature of this chronology takes on a subjective 
tinge; Baudelaire’s strong reaction reveals no uncertain contempt for the “bonnes 
langues” that have unequivocally denounced his poetry as derivative. A caustic and 
typically Baudelaireian sarcasm penetrates even his casual correspondence.  Referenced 
beneath the bitterness, though, is a kind of unity of idea, an affinity of purpose with Poe. 
Having acknowledged the filial nature of their theoretical bond, and the subjective nature 
of any chronological attempt to define this bond, describing it in detail can now be 
pursued textually. That is, Baudelaire’s poetry actually clarifies – or rather, shows – the 
complexity of his relationship to Poe better than his criticism, or even a history of that 
criticism.  
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  “Le Mauvais vitrier” is a striking title. It remains utterly specific, doing little 
more than pointing to the story’s literal content. It answers the reader’s – that is, the 
critic’s – initial and principle question: what is the story just begun about? This title 
clarifies – or seems to – in precisely the way Baudelaire rejects in his introductory notes 
on Poe. And yet, whether or not the story is in fact about a bad glazier remains a question 
that goes unanswered. The glint imagined in Baudelaire’s eyes is the very same glint he, 
in his “Notes nouvelles,” imagines in Poe’s own. This is a title that makes fun of titles. 
And humor is indeed the intention. Baudelaire’s insistence on monikers that invoke the 
humorous – “caricature,” “farceur,” “jongleur” – reinforces this intention by going so far 
as to perform said humor with regard to Poe. For the subject matter of Poe’s work is 
inherently not funny; recall his relation to the Gothic mentioned supra. Is it not funny, 
then, that Baudelaire would find the use of this darkness itself funny? From the very title, 
Baudelaire invokes irony by inviting humorous juxtaposition. Like Poe, he caricatures a 
title, uses the title itself to question a title’s discursive role.  
 The title’s ironic flippancy also ushers a reader into the text. In that it is obvious 
or utilitarian, the title in fact ironically induces subtle intrigue; this intrigue has little to do 
how or why said glazier is “bad.” It only becomes important as the story reveals the “bad 
glazier” to play a supporting, rather than leading role. The title’s simplicity is deifed by 
the text. Baudelaire’s claim about Poe seems immediately pertinent: poetry is defined by 
that use of words, which leads those same words to question themselves. The intrigue 
mentioned functions independently of reader or critic. The words inscribe it in 
themselves.  
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 Having been ushered into the text, its opening immediately confronts, marking a 
tonic switch to the general that juxtaposes the title’s straight-forward specificity. That is, 
whether or not the text actually involves a bad glazier is not immediately evident: “Il y a 
des natures purement contemplatives et tout à fait impropres à l’action, qui cependant, 
sous une impulsion mystérieuse et inconnue, agissent quelquefois avec une rapidité dont 
ells se seraient crues elle-mêmes incapable” (Baudelaire, Œuvres complètes, 238). “Il y 
des natures…” Can a story begin more generally? The first sentence, a lengthy paragraph, 
exaggerates this generality, referring to a swath of the population, a collection of 
individuals defined (seemingly) by their existence. These “natures” simply “exist.” The 
French construction “il y a,” like the English equivalent “there are,” reinforces the 
openings general ambiguity. Yet a critical reading of “there are” invites the question: 
where? These words in combination undo themselves – that is, their function – by 
instigating this question. They cannot exist without it. As such, they are words that do 
little more than function; they are defined by this function. Recall the extent to which 
Baudelaire denigrates words that simply function in “Notes nouvelles.” The meaning of 
this opening must then contain the ironic self-reference “Notes nouvelles” calls for. In 
that it does, it also invites the very same critique offered by the essay, but enhanced by its 
placement within prose-poetry itself. That is to say, the general tone of this story’s 
opening – its rhetorical reliance on discursive constructions – leads to the initial 
impression that it is not a story at all. It seems at first a natural history or catalogue. That 
is, in the spirit of the current essay, the opening sentence explains.  
 Of course, this “explanation” is bounded initially by the presence of a lack 
thereof. That which Baudelaire explains appears to be singular in that it cannot be 
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explained: “[…] sous une impulsion mystérieuse et inconnue […]” (Baudelaire, 238). It 
is in fact “unknown.” Its mysterious nature both permits its discursive inculcation and 
ensures it remains inherently hazy, blurred, like a photograph taken while unfocused on 
purpose. While words permit this definition, they also clarify its inability, its lack. Irony 
is inevitably present. There is a subtle humor present in this irony as well: that a word 
used to clarify in fact blurs is funny on an ontological level. The nature – the being – of 
the word as object in itself is thus made subtly apparent.  
 The choice of the word “impulsion” is also key, and critical to the current 
comparison of Baudelaire’s text with Poe’s “The Imp of the Perverse.” Like the other 
words Baudelaire chooses in his opening paragraph, “impulsion” complicates an 
understanding of the text because what it defines is by nature vague. Whence this 
impulsion? The veritable lack of origin that defines this “mysterious, unknown” force is 
its defining feature, while also the feature that renders it the most vague. Physically 
speaking, forces describe their origin, their “doing.” Force does not simply “do” itself. 
Yet the force described here is alienated from any such actor, and seems somehow to 
appear. Baudelaire thus uses grammatical fluidity to undermine a normalized conception 
of force as enacted. He goes on to state that the force described is precisely the kind 
modern modes of knowledge fail utterly to grasp. He condemns such modes to 
devastating effect in his “Notes nouvelles”:  
“Mais ce à quoi les professeurs jurés n’ont pas pensé, c’est que, dans le 
mouvement de la vie, telle complication, telle combinaison peut se présenter, tout 
à fait inattendue pour leur sagesse d’écoliers. Et alors leur langue insuffisante se 
trouve en défaut, comme dans le cas, – phénomène qui se multipliera peut-être 
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avec des variantes, – où une nation commence par la décadence, et débute par où 
les autres finissent.” (Baudelaire, Notes nouvelles, 6)  
According to Baudelaire, a language he deems “academic” utterly fails to capture the 
“complication” of lived experience. Rather, its insistence upon its own trite proscriptions 
limits it, leaving it “at fault.” This language uses language to project its own sufficiency 
by claiming that it is sufficient. Baudelaire refers to this same irony when he writes of a 
“mysterious and unknown impulsion.” These words perform their critique rather than 
describe it, though; it is a critique through rather than at, and thus Baudelaire’s constant 
and unrelenting criticism. Every word he uses begins to appear both a critique of 
something, and critical of itself. His words refuse to defer the simultaneous outward gaze 
and inward turn that lend their meaning real fortitude. It is, though, a vocabulary of 
contradiction: that which seems strong often and easily collapses into the vague, the 
tenuous. That these words may be understood only fleetingly begins to define the nature 
of their power. Baudelaire also explicitly uses the same words when discussing Poe’s 
œuvre in his “Notes nouvelles,” as will be shown. Remember them, for they serve also as 
pivot toward the analysis involving morals mentioned supra.  
 Before pivoting toward the moral, the remainder of “Le Mauvais vitrier” bears 
examination. The second sentence (and second paragraph) begin by introducing 
specificity. It is introduced in small doses, though, eased into the text carefully and at 
length. The vehicle of specificity in this instance is example. In order to better explain the 
general conundrum introduced at the outset, slightly more specific language is employed. 
Perhaps “explain” itself is too general a term, for rather than explain as clarify, this 
language attempts to coral the transience of the aforementioned “impulsion” within an 
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explanatory gesture. Example here is perhaps better described as a kind of explicit 
analogy:  
“Tel qui, craignant de trouver chez son concierge une nouvelle chagrinante, rôde 
lâchement une heure devant sa porte sans oser rentrer, tel qui garde quinze jours 
une lettre sans la décacheter, ou ne se résigne qu'au bout de six mois à opérer une 
démarche nécessaire depuis un an, se sentent quelquefois brusquement précipités 
vers l'action par une force irrésistible, comme la flèche d'un arc” (Baudelaire, OC, 
238).  
Note that litany – an explicit pointing – ensues. This gesture, although explicit, is not 
entirely so, since the individuals referred to – “tel qui….” – reside within the same 
obscurity of the opening’s generality. The sentence’s manic, undirected expanse further 
links it to the “mystery” of the opening. The examples mentioned are simply examples, 
with no textual relation to the story beyond their analogic ability to invoke the opening’s 
mystery with more perceived accuracy. They form a kind of fiction within fiction, yet 
that they are fictitious is key to their gestural efficacy. By mentioning these specific 
experiences in a general way, Baudelaire seems to say, “You know the type.” There is an 
implied familiarity that renders the general example more explicit. As a result, this 
introduction is more inviting than the opening, more relatable. Perhaps this move in fact 
performs relatability. Once again, the fiction as device appears, its oiled cogs whirring 
efficiently. Somewhere, vaguely, the inkling of a narrator appears, a voice suggested by 
the establishment of a fictive rapport, this rapport both fictional and created by fiction. 
 A narrative voice creeps to the fore, becoming, via the intensification of 
specificity mentioned supra, more and more present. The story’s next paragraph begins 
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with the subtle yet definitive introduction of a discursive narrative presence, although this 
presence remains extra-textual: “Un de mes amis, le plus inoffensif rêveur qui ait existé, a 
mis une fois le feu à une forêt pour voir, disait-il, si le feu prenait avec autant de facilité 
qu'on l'affirme généralement. Dix fois de suite, l'expérience manqua ; mais, à la onzième, 
elle réussit beaucoup trop bien” (Baudelaire, 238). Within this paragraph, the most 
important word is the third, “mes,” a measly possessive pronoun. Yet as pronoun, it 
stands for another word; in this case that word is not a word but the concept of a narrative 
as told by a narrator. The volume of the word’s implications – that for which it stands – 
again far exceed its formal presence.4 This juxtaposition in turn creates precisely the self-
referential irony infecting the story, and from which the story cannot escape.  
 In writing “Un de mes amis…” Baudelaire ushers in a kind of cordial familiarity 
juxtaposed in turn with the opening’s unfamiliarity, its acknowledged lack of the kind of 
certainty often associated with “narrator” as omniscient. Here, at least, the narrator 
appears in order to offer what sounds very much like a story, a tiny fiction that satisfies 
the rules of Aristotelian plot. This micro-story – a story-within-a-story – has a beginning, 
middle and end, as well as rising action and falling. It also has a moral of sorts, although 
this “moral” – which will be discussed at length – constitutes precisely the lack thereof. A 
semblance of omniscience is present. Trust as relation appears. To the extent that a 
reading concedes this tiny vignette’s semblance of veracity, a inaugurates a fictive 
relationship with the narrator Baudelaire’s possessive pronouns establish. If anything, this 
moment of “truth” further underscores through contrast the troubling nature of the 
opening’s insecurity. This insecurity could be said to persist through the explicit story 
                                                
4 The concept of “excess” should be remembered, as it will factor significantly in the discussion 
of Mallarmé’s poetry below. 
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discussed in the form of question: why exactly did he do it? Key here is that the narrator 
does not offer an explanation – the vignette is troubling because it appears true, while 
simultaneously defying rational explanation.   
 Baudelaire maintains his specifying trajectory in the next paragraph, which 
comprises a second micro-story, this one the macabre tale of another of the narrator’s 
friends. Like the first, it also uses explanation explicitly, The story begins: “Un autre 
allumera un cigare à côté d'un tonneau de poudre, pour voir, pour savoir, pour tenter la 
destinée, pour se contraindre lui-même à faire preuve d'énergie, pour faire le joueur, pour 
connaître les plaisirs de l'anxiété, pour rien, par caprice, par désœuvrement” (Baudelaire, 
238). This moment, like the first, displays the narrator’s power – and thus the power of 
narrative. Its dénoument is not made explicit, and yet the tension of the moment is 
arresting. Besides the ever-present “Why?” this second story makes clear it is a story by 
asking another more pressing, but less relevant question: what happened to him? Note as 
well Baudelaire’s italicization of phrasal fragments, which, like the second paragraph 
described supra create the gesture they describe. Insistence here is key: Baudelaire’s 
narrator is intent on conjuring the complexity of this mystifying impulse, which he has 
“diagnosed” within so many of his companions. “Diagnosed” is placed in quotation 
marks here because the implications of such a word are explicitly denigrated and 
formally tested in the story. Recall Baudelaire’s claim in “Notes nouvelles” that the 
exaggerated importance of fidelity, accuracy, and truth in then-modern discourse prevent 
precisely this diagnosis. The state he wishes to describe is too far removed from the 
confines of normalization for language to reach. And yet the narrator does not shy from 
using language explain. Thus the formal importance of the narrator’s insistence on using 
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explanation This contradiction, while ironic, is also tempered by a self-referential gesture 
toward its own inability to explain. The resulting irony is perhaps more important; the 
narrator spends most of the opening explaining the extent to which that which is being 
explained cannot be explained. The story thus implicates its own failure from the outset. 
It criticizes itself before all else. 
 This can be claimed before examining the entirety of the story in detail because 
the rest of the story functions ultimately as performance of this claim; that is, the story 
itself makes this claim first by performing it. The power of “Le Mauvais vitrier” comes 
from its ability to make this claim about itself before any exegetical scalpel  crosses its 
discursive flesh. The story continues: the narrator offers yet more examples of friends 
overcome by the same mysterious impulse. It seems there is an epidemic, to employ once 
more a language denied by the story itself. But following his third vignette, the narrator 
makes a bold rhetorical move by asking precisely the question his multiple micro-stories 
have themselves asked. The formulation of this question is also striking for its brevity, 
which further enacts the shock latent within the question itself. “Pourquoi?” asks the 
narrator, “Parce que…” (Baudelaire, 239). What an answer. Again, as so often, an 
infinity appears contained within a frankly rather insipid rhetorical construction. “Why?”: 
the very question this essay posited the existence of earlier. It is stated baldly, matter-of-
factly, without buffer or padding, simply an indent. It forces what narrative direction the 
story had amassed to a grinding halt. The explanatory tone of the opening prevails in this 
inquisitorial interjection. And yet, its failure as explanation is made all too obvious. To 
answer this ultimate and prevailing question with a mere “Because…” is equivalent to a 
tepid shrug of the narrative shoulders. This maddeningly lacking answer is genius, 
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though, precisely because it is maddening. Once again, as in the poem’s very opening 
words, this pivotal narrative – and argumentative (note the blurring of creative and 
analytic) – moment is given over to a rhetorical construction.  
 Much like its English equivalent, two words crippled by use into a banal one, 
“Parce que…” is little more than the logical, inevitable, and “correct” response to the all-
important question. As an answer, it is little more than a let down. Yet in that it 
recognizes its own rhetorical construction, it also permits its transparency. The failure of 
language to grasp the complexity of the “condition” the story recognizes is again 
performed, this time by the reflexive use of a stock answer. Its use is reflexive because it 
follows on the heels of its question without ceremony. It abuts the question, belying an 
almost scientific clarity, a near legal brevity, and an entirely “useful” reduction. It seems 
unnecessary to point out the irony in such a usage, yet the way in which Baudelaire as 
author punctuates his narrator’s response complicates his apparent dejected defeatism. 
The use of an ellipsis masterfully circumvents this defeat by first and foremost 
acknowledging it. More words are not necessary. Instead, the stock answer instigates the 
absence of words suggested by the ellipsis. The presence of this ellipsis is thus the 
absence of words. It refers beyond words by demarcating the immediate geography of 
their lack. This ellipsis also belies further reliance on text – here reduced to punctuation – 
as discursive device. Which is to say, the presence of an ellipsis indicates something 
beyond the page, beyond word, yet exists only through its being written. The narrator’s 
theatrical involvement in the ellipsis – the aforementioned shoulder shrug – is unclear. It 
is in fact speculative. The very use of “shoulder shrug” references the current essay’s lazy 
reliance on analogy to suggest what precisely this ellipsis might refer to. That said, it 
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refers principally to itself, and its own existence as formal punctuation. In this way, the 
story perpetuates its thorough and multivalent self-critique. 
 Directly following this discursive shrug, the narrator concludes his specifying 
trajectory – a rhetorical telescoping – by introducing the grammatical zenith of 
specificity: the first person singular. Suddenly, shockingly, once again without padding or 
preparation, the narrator introduces himself. That is, a narrator becomes the narrator. The 
presumed truth inherent in a friend’s description – if friendship implies proximity – here 
becomes incontestable. To the extent that friendship (in this instance the third person) is 
indeed proximity, the first person is no less than precise, precision being not truth, but the 
terms of an agreement with the reader established by the narrative itself. If use of the first 
person implies honesty, validity, and authenticity, then its fictional presence must carry 
the same weight. Key here is that this fiction utilizes the aforementioned agreement in 
order to create the “effect” (Poe, Critical Theory, 198) of sincerity.  
 The opening’s telescoping trajectory thus transforms an omnipresent  generality 
into pinpoint specificity. Even the use of verbal tense, the passé composé, implies 
inherent narrative precision. Note that in English the translation of this tense is the 
“perfect.” The fact that the very application of this tense implies the truth of what is said 
strongly suggests the discursive nature of the so-called truth. Yet in this context, use of 
the first person singular – an admission of subjectivity and opinion – seems week as 
regards scientific discourse’s reliance on accuracy and impartiality is concerned. Much 
scientific writing avoids the semblance of partiality by using the impersonal third, or 
plural first. Baudelaire as author here chooses to consciously eschew such semblance of 
truth as proven in favor of the personal intimation of faith – that is, a belief in the facts of 
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the narrator’s narrative, despite only discursive evidence. Irony cannot be avoided. In 
choosing faith over proof, Baudelaire furthers his already biting critique. The present “I,” 
personal and subjective though it may be, is ironically more “true” than any objective 
rationalization blind to its own shortcomings. Baudelaire’s “I” is more true precisely 
because it moderates its pretense of “truth” by acknowledging its failure.  
 As the opening would suggest, the narrator’s “I” is both true and fallible, honest 
and false. “I” introduces himself this way: “J'ai été plus d'une fois victime de ces crises et 
de ces élans, qui nous autorisent à croire que des Démons malicieux se glissent en nous et 
nous font accomplir, à notre insu, leurs plus absurdes volontés” (Baudelaire, 239). Notice 
that this introduction includes explicit mention of belief, will, and authority – an authority 
always already undermined. This “I” that relies heavily on belief. Rather than truth, belief 
is a willingness to acknowledge truth exactly where it cannot be pointed at, shown or 
described. Notice also that the very thing “I” has been gesturing toward from the 
beginning, that initial and omnipresent “mysterious and unknown impulsion,” is here 
given a name. It is a name in part because is capitalized, although capitalization again 
references the discursive structure that permits this name. “Démons” are not simply the 
“demons” to which the word literally refers, but the core of the narrator’s opening 
argument given a name. All the vague gesturing, the digressional examples, the micro-
stories – all initial explanation is here summer up. This summation interestingly parallels 
the narrative’s telescopic culmination in first person singular. In as much as the narrator 
is named (“I”), that which he attempts to conjure is also named (“Démons”). The parallel 
is both artful and direct. As the origin of the text – its narrator as reporter – becomes 
purportedly clear, the subject of his report is also clarified by analogy. And yet this 
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clarity has been shown by the text itself to be contested: what could be less true than 
fiction, less precise than a name? The discursive reality of these concepts reveals their 
failure and once more ushers in irony. More, the presence of an ironically unclear clarity 
at this moment of definition subtly and powerfully redefines the terms that have 
themselves been claimed to do just that. The text suggests the Démon supposedly 
capitalized by “I” is actually irony itself. With regard to the text, irony has been 
discursively shown to perform the insidious and malevolent destruction these Démons 
perform in the narrator’s exemplary tales. Irony destabilizes, it questions, and perhaps 
above all, its presence criticizes.  
 Before a look at the ending of Baudelaire’s text and a comparison between “Le 
Mauvais vitrier” and “The Imp of the Perverse,” the presence of morality in “Le Mauvais 
vitrier” must be addressed. This moral backdrop, perhaps subsumed by the discursive 
nature of its construction, plays an important role in facilitating what is its essential 
undoing, its deconstruction. The example of the “Démons” just mentioned is extremely 
pertinent. This “Démon” is textual before it is moral; even though the text’s narrative 
doesn’t make this argument explicit, its nature as text is sure to. But the word “demon” 
cannot fail to supply a moral overtone. The word implies malevolence and trickery – 
everything redolent of evil, in the most moral sense. In the definitive paragraph 
mentioned, Baudelaire writes: “des Démons malicieux se glissent en nous et nous font 
accomplir, à notre insu, leurs plus absurdes volontés” (Baudelaire, 239). These Demons 
are malicious in that their intent is bad – here note the relevance of the story’s title. The 
narrator’s vague reference to a “mysterious and unknown impulsion” comes with the 
moral designation bad. And yet, this designation represents an attempt to reinvigorate the 
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term, to redefine it, rejuvenate it, instill it with new life and potency. Bad is not simply 
the opposite of good. Like the impulsion the narrator seeks to define, the opening of this 
poem also seeks to define – that is, complicate – a tired, lame, trite conception of “bad” 
as moral, and push it beyond the normativity of morals in general. This is a moral sense 
that seeks the very same complication words themselves seek in the text.  
 How then to reconcile the present redefinition of morality with Baudelaire’s 
disdain – and also Poe’s – for the utilitarian story that seeks only to further a moral end? 
Even in “Le Mauvais vitrier,” Baudelaire explicitly decries the failure of those who 
attempt explanation via moral doctrine:  
“Le moraliste et le médecin, qui prétendent tout savoir, ne peuvent pas expliquer 
d'où vient si subitement une si folle énergie à ces âmes paresseuses et 
voluptueuses, et comment, incapables d'accomplir les choses les plus simples et 
les plus nécessaires, elles trouvent à une certaine minute un courage de luxe pour 
exécuter les actes les plus absurdes et souvent même les plus dangereux.” 
(Baudelaire, 238).  
This disregard is primarily textual – the doctor and the moralist fail first discursively – 
but with regard to that bad just described, the presence of the moralist is important in that 
he, like the doctor, fails. The moralist as traditional, archetypal even, cannot fathom a 
new “absurd” badness. Its connection with the absurd is key because “absurd” defines, 
like the impulse it describes, an absence, specifically of rationality. To the extent that 
grammar, syntax, diction, and orthography have been agreed upon as rational – that is, 
correct – Baudelaire’s mysterious impulse becomes the opposition – incorrect – yet 
correctly, using correct diction, syntax, etc. The subversion of this system includes the 
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moral overtone mentioned: the correct can in fact become incorrect, the good in fact bad. 
Baudelaire writes about the bad with respect to Poe’s fiction in “Notes nouvelles”:  
 “Mais voici plus important que tout : nous noterons que cet auteur, produit 
d’un siècle infatué de lui-même, enfant d’une nation plus infatuée d’elle-même 
qu’aucune autre, a vu clairement, a imperturbablement affirmé la méchanceté 
naturelle de l’Homme. Il y a dans l’homme, dit-il, une force mystérieuse dont la 
philosophie moderne ne veut pas tenir compte ; et cependant, sans cette force 
innommée, sans ce penchant primordial, une foule d’actions humaines resteront 
inexpliquées, inexplicables. Ces actions n’ont d’attrait que parce qu’elles sont 
mauvaises, dangereuses ; elles possèdent l’attirance du gouffre. Cette force 
primitive, irrésistible, est la Perversité naturelle, qui fait que l’homme est sans 
cesse et à la fois homicide et suicide, assassin et bourreau ; – car, ajoute-t-il, avec 
une subtilité remarquablement satanique, l’impossibilité de trouver un motif 
raisonnable suffisant pour certaines actions mauvaises et périlleuses pourrait nous 
conduire à les considérer comme le résultat des suggestions du Diable” 
(Baudelaire, NN, 9). 
Note the fascinating insistence on the inherent “evil of man.” Perhaps this evil is more a 
capacity than an explicit tendency toward wrongdoing, but its claim is abundantly clear. 
Note also that Baudelaire uses the very same language he employs in “Le Mauvais 
vitrier” to describe this capacity for evil: “une force mystérieuse.” Note again his 
insistence that modern ways of interacting with morals – even philosophy – utterly fail to 
conceptualize this inverse moral capacity. For Baudelaire, and Baudelaire claims for Poe 
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as well, it is the role of fiction, and more importantly of poetry, to engage this capacity 
for evil. Recall the title of Baudelaire’s one published collection: “Les Fleurs du Mal.”  
 And yet the responsibility Baudelaire and Poe award poetry by entrusting it with 
understanding this moral capacity for vice involves just the subversion mentioned earlier. 
That is to say, poetry cannot aim to perpetuate the moral dichotomy of good and bad. 
Rather, poetry represents precisely the means of showing the falsity behind this polar 
conception of morality, and not only its falsity, but its constant perpetuation through the 
“correct” grammatical construction. The appeal to absurdity is thus an ardent and 
meaningful one. Those interstices where all meaning appears lost seem now the very 
moments where the possibility of redefinition is present, perhaps even the possibility of 
an imaginary beyond definition. 
 If perhaps apparent, it is still important to reiterate the claim made earlier that 
Baudelaire’s “Le Mauvais vitrier” is both a prose-poem and a critique of Poe’s. The first 
aspect of comparison is the telescopic opening. This formal aspect appears in both 
stories, although reduced significantly in Baudelaire’s. The reference is explicit, and on 
this most general level, implies the essence of the claim just supra. Much like 
Baudelaire’s thorough and laudatory analysis of Poe in “Notes nouvelles,” the 
fundamental reference between theses stories’ respective openings implies that they 
cannot be understood separately. Their respective meanings are tied up in one another. 
Another general formal characteristic complicates their intertwined state: Baudelaire 
refers to his composition as a “poème en prose,” while Poe refers to his own as a “tale” or 
“story.” Use of these monikers highlights the critical aspect of Baudelaire’s text moreso 
than Poe’s. At this general level, it can be shown that Baudelaire’s intention involves a 
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more explicit critique of the poetic, as opposed to Poe’s singularly fictional one – 
although like Baudelaire’s it implies “in prose,” it doesn’t simultaneously intimate 
poetry. Baudelaire says as much in the “Note Nouvelles” when he refers to the short story 
(“nouvelle”) as Poe’s coinage:  
“Je sais que dans toutes les littératures des efforts ont été faits, souvent heureux, 
pour créer des contes purement poétiques ; Edgar Poe lui-même en a fait de très-
beaux. Mais ce sont des luttes et des efforts qui ne servent qu’à démontrer la force 
des vrais moyens adaptés aux buts correspondants, et je ne serais pas éloigné de 
croire que chez quelques auteurs, les plus grands qu’on puisse choisir, ces 
tentations héroïques vinssent d’un désespoir” (Baudelaire, 19).  
This quotation is remarkable because, having praised Poe’s short stories, Baudelaire 
claims their utter and inevitable failure on the grounds that they are not poetry. They 
approach poetry, yes, but they do not, and will never achieve it, the tragedy of the 
moment captured in “désespoir.” One wonders what poetry actually achieves the ideal 
Baudelaire describes here. His own prose-poem then offers a related critique on the 
failure of the poetical form itself. This critique, though, is only made possible by the 
critique of fiction Poe’s nouvelle describes discursively.  
 A second aspect of formal similarity involves the pieces’ endings; both conclude 
with a question. That said, the stories end in very different places. Poe’s narrator 
concludes his monologue on the verge of death, while only the prospect of such 
devastating “péril” (Baudelaire, OC, 240) is present for Baudelaire’s. Baudelaire’s 
narrator is never physically punished (nor does he await the certainty of punishment) but 
the presence of punishment is key. In fact, its presence is one of the defining aspects of 
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both stories. As has been argued, the discursive definition of a moral code that deems 
these supposedly unreasonable acts “bad” actually creates the acts themselves. They are 
made possible only because they are forbidden, deemed morally reprehensible and 
understood as fundamentally irrational. What’s at stake for Baudelaire though is 
somehow fundamentally closer to the nature of poetry, and the power of art itself. “La vie 
en beau!” is echoed like a mantra throughout the ending of “Le Mauvais vitrier.” It’s a 
kind of rallying cry, and definitely belligerent in nature. Here the critical aspect of the 
poem becomes evident: this is a “poem” that eschews formal beauty in favor of 
referentiality and formal criticism, while calling, crying, demanding beauty in life. 
Beauty, the poem claims, is life’s only goal. And yet the poem that claims it is inherently 
not beautiful. Nor is it ugly per se, but it formally defies poetical conventions intrinsically 
associated with beauty. And thus the destruction of the glazier’s wares that is the pivotal 
moment in the story is performed in the text: Baudelaire destroys poetry itself by 
crippling it into a prose-like form.  
 In this context, Baudelaire’s final question is a harrowing one, equally as 
challenging and impossibly rhetorical as Poe’s final question in “The Imp of the 
Perverse.” Baudelaire’s final question represents a pointed commentary on Poe’s. “But 
where?” in Poe is complicated to begin with because the narrator has already condemned 
himself to Hell unequivocally. Self-doubt in the face of the afterlife is tempered by and 
echoed in Baudelaire’s final question, which seems to suggest that “where?” is 
unimportant; what matters if the infinity of the beautiful, the present: “Ces plaisanteries 
nerveuses ne sont pas sans péril, et on peut souvent les payer cher. Mais qu'importe 
l'éternité de la damnation à qui a trouvé dans une seconde l'infini de la jouissance ?” 
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(Baudelaire, 240). What’s at stake for Baudelaire is less the nature of man and more the 
nature of his art – the question of a human capacity for reason as defined by its lack in 
Poe becomes in Baudelaire the capacity of human art to question precisely this presence 
(or lack) of reason. Baudelaire criticizes Poe’s text by asking the text itself – the words 
that comprise it – criticize themselves.   
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Chapter III 
 
Mallarmé’s Polemic 
 
 Poe and Baudelaire, it is suggested, constitute a self-referential unit of critique. 
They complete each other in that they correspond, but their correspondence also 
complicates both by encouraging new and variant interpretations. The critical application 
of Mallarmé’s text to the Poe-Baudelaire unit discussed further complicates an 
interpretation of this unit. In complicating it also enriches, though, for Mallarmé offers an 
antidote to the Möbius strip-predicament mentioned. His work – both creative and 
analytic – here constitutes the critical element that ultimately completes the Baudelaire-
Poe cycle by suggesting its annulment. That said, the finality of Mallarmé’s œuvre – its 
capacity to destroy (annul?) – is something this essay will present in a critical light as 
well. Mallarmé’s application with respect to Poe and Baudelaire thus both enhances and 
reduces an interpretation of their work; considering Poe and Baudelaire in relation to 
Mallarmé allows for a similarly paradoxical analysis of his work.   
 Unlike Baudelaire, Mallarmé did not present explicitly detail his critical 
involvement with Poe’s work. He translated Poe’s poetry – most famously “The Raven,” 
published in 18755 – and wrote poetry about Poe – “Le tombeau d’Edgar Poe” – but he 
did not engage with Poe’s work in an explicitly critical way. That said, this essay 
suggests Mallarmé’s “Le Démon de l’analogie” in fact engages critically with Poe’s “The 
Imp of the Perverse” by referring to it, in the same way Baudelaire’s “Le Mauvais vitrier” 
does in reference to the same poem. In so doing, it also offers its onw commentary on 
Baudelaire’s poem’s commentary. The three poets’ nexus thus represents a set of 
                                                
5 Cite? Yes. As far as I can tell, it’s Le Corbeau (avec illustrations par E. Manet), Richard 
Lesclide éditeur, Paris, 1875? 
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variations on a theme; the reference to musicality will be important considering 
Mallarmé’s critical reliance on music as analogy for poetry’s goals. In typical 
Mallarméan fashion, though, his prose-poem “Le Démon de l’analogie” questions 
precisely what is theme and what is variation, while simultaneously attaining the exalted 
plane of poetry. The power of Mallarmé’s poetry to question, destabilize and 
recontextualize while remaining poetry makes it extremely pertinent to a discussion of 
Baudelaire and Poe. And thus, like these two poets, the fortitude of Mallarmé’s work is 
derived from its propensity to mean many things at once by meaning other than is said. 
The double meaning of the written word discussed above is directly related to Mallarmé’s 
work; his work in turn deepens a discussion of the evasion of meaning by self-
consciously referring to precisely this discussion. Before showing how Mallarmé deepens 
this discussion in his poetry – or relating it to the Poe-Baudelaire discussion – it must be 
shown how he does so in critical writing. 
 This essay suggests that, like Poe and Baudelaire, Mallarmé’s creative and 
analytic writings are all critical in capacity. While this is perhaps true, it assumes 
Mallarmé intended distinction between his creative and analytic work. Yet the work itself 
defies this distinction. As in the essay “Le Mystère dans le lettres,” first published in 
1896, his work in fact criticizes the “critical” as it removes itself from poetry. Mallarmé’s 
defiance in the face of what he refers to as “la loi” (Mallarmé, 286) is constant, and 
constantly radical. As will be shown, the constancy of Mallarmé’s dissent reveals each 
word he chooses to be precisely that: a choice. Insistence on the radical power of artistic 
choice invigorates his text. Like in Poe and Baudelaire, the usage of words necessarily 
removes them from this poetical plane, limiting their “beauty.” But in Mallarmé, the 
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critical manages to critique while simultaneously gesturing toward the poetical plane it 
critiques.  A very complex beauty is achieved.. Mallarmé achieves precisely this beauty 
in “Le Mystère dans les lettres.” Of course, calling it an “essay” immediately lessens it by 
failing to capture its genre-defying qualities. The “essay” is as much a poem as the poem 
of Mallarmé’s examined below. The result its genre-confusion and -assimilation is: both 
“essay” and “poem” deserve redefinition as terms in themselves. The essay itself also 
points toward this redefinition. 
 In his notes on the text, Bertrand Marchal suggests that “Le Mystère dans les 
lettres” originated as a form of reply to an article published earlier the same year (and in 
the same periodical) by Marcel Proust entitled “Contre l’obscurité” (Mallarmé, 499). 
Proust’s article was not necessarily directed at Mallarmé, but he nonetheless seems to 
have understood it as a personally relevant affront. In “Le Mystère” (his purported reply), 
Mallarmé starts by making his own claim that literature should endeavor to portray itself 
– recall Poe’s use of “caricature” – as indifferent: “Tout écrit […] doit […] présenter […] 
un sens même indifférent […]” (Mallarmé, 281). This claim seems directly in contrast 
with the nature of his reply, which is profoundly polemical. This is important because 
Mallarmé, a poet for whom words themselves offer all explanation necessary, here 
employs an explanatory tone. Note though that literature “must present” itself as 
“indifferent.” Whether or not it must be indifferent – that is, in substance – is unclear. As 
Marchal also points out, this explanation does not fail to be polemical (Mallarmé, 499). 
Of course, the very same explanation will in due time explain its own superfluity. His 
polemic’s key proposition is thus paradox. The result is the polemical application of a 
dialectical form that will eventually annul itself by rendering its explicit incoherence 
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paramount. How precisely does “Le Mystère” annul itself? First, it complicates the 
aforementioned paradox by presenting this polemic as bona fide debate. In so doing, it 
ushers in a visually and rhetorically explicit formality. .  
 How better to question formalistic modes of literary discourse than by using them 
to do the questioning? Mallarmé does precisely this in “Le Mystère,” adopting a 
dialectical form (mentioned supra) that his essay then negates in order to annul itself. 
Rather than approach it chronologically – thesis, antithesis, synthesis – starting from its 
synthesis best serves an exegesis of this dialectic. Mallarmé uses explicit visual cues to 
indicate the rhetoric that define his polemic. These cues include the use of tirets longs as 
final punctuation, the sequestration of a few words to separate paragraphs, an emphasis 
on grammatically inconsistent phrase structure, and abundant surrounding blank space; in 
short, Mallarmé goes to great length to remove these formal indicators from their 
discursive surroundings. The result is a map that avoids various and complex pitfalls.  
 At the polemic’s dialectical synthesis – where it directly engages the 
aforementioned paradox – the removal of formal definition reveals profound beauty and 
meaning: “Lire—” (Mallarmé, 287). The transcendent beauty of this phrase is done no 
justice here. It must be referred to within its proper visual context. Its meaning is reduced 
having proverbially cut it out and pasted it, but also multiplied by its extreme rhetorical 
presentation. Not only is the word “lire” itself important, but its position, its punctuation, 
and (most importantly) what else is not present near it are shown to be significant as well. 
What Mallarmé refers to elsewhere as “l’écrit” (Mallarmé, 285) appropriates new 
meaning here. The beauty of “Lire—” exists beyond that to which the word refers; the 
word itself is beautiful.  
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 If this moment is indeed a “synthesis” the text must also imply its own thesis and 
antithesis as well, and it does so at precisely the moment Mallarmé decides to insert 
himself into it. This moment is almost as jarring as the synthesis discussed, but its 
surprise is explicitly polemical in a different way. When Mallarmé inserts himself into 
the text, words momentarily relinquish their subjectivity: “Je préfère, devant l’agression, 
rétorquer que des contemporains ne savent pas lire—” (Mallarmé, 287). Note that 
Mallarmé himself is purportedly the one “retorting.” It seems the words that are present 
no longer take charge; an “I” – a subject – has superimposed. And yet, implication aside, 
this sentence – note also that it is displaced visually from its concluding clauses – 
discursively implies the explicit presence of the dialectic this essay posited. There is an 
inherent opposition of meanings at work, which is further substantiated by the words’ 
form.  
 But what exactly is the “opposition of meanings” Mallarmé and his words refer 
to? A better question is perhaps: to whom does Mallarmé refer when he writes “des 
contemporains”? His remains explicitly vague. In fact, throughout his essay, Mallarmé is 
wary of ever actually specifying who precisely these contemporaries might be. He instead 
refers to them as “les malins” (281), “les individus” (282), “dénonciateurs” (287), “gens” 
(287), also using the various and vaguer pronouns they elicit, like “les,” “leur,” and 
“eux.” His obscurity is intentional. He means to force those he says “ne savent pas lire” 
into the very thing they are incapable of. That is, “Le Mystère” is meant to teach those 
who don’t know (whoever they may be, and perhaps that means everyone) how to read. 
By providing the antidote for the disease it diagnoses, the polemic of “Le mystère” is 
closely related to that of Baudelaire’s “Notes nouvelles,” which, as discussed, attempts to 
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prime a readership for the complexity of the author’s poetry by revealing the functioning 
of a related poetry (Poe’s). Rather than refer specifically to a related work, though, 
Mallarmé’s essay attempts to “cure” with more general criticism. Its general criticism 
becomes, in its generality, a critique of criticism itself. The sentence above could then 
refer generally to all those who criticize, and not only criticize him. Thus Mallarmé 
suggests further that critics in general don’t know how to read. Although the essay’s 
genesis may well have been Proust’s critique, Mallarmé replies by finding a general fault. 
The problem, he suggests, is a systemic one.  
 Having identified and described the locus Mallarmé defines as his argument’s 
synthesis, the text obligates formal articulation of the parties at odds: thesis and 
antithesis. The present essay claims Mallarmé capitulates to his text’s demands by using 
the argumentative framework his conclusion necessitates.6 Whether or not this claim can 
be successfully demonstrated, the text both inspires and permits the present reading – 
“reading” being an important word in this context. Also important is that the “coherence” 
implied by a formal framework is consequently undone by the text itself. Said framework 
must then exist solely as exegetical device posited by the present analysis. Rather than 
explain (or worse: simplify), said framework points toward a reading of Mallarmé that 
evades comprehension or understanding. This is why the word “reading” is so important. 
It, like other words Mallarmé favors, retains its all-important generality, even considering 
subsequent description. Rather than specify – which is to say, limit – it produces, 
referring constantly beyond itself. In this light, the word seems to produce its subsequent 
description: “Appuyer, selon la page, au blanc, qui l’inaugure, son ingénuité, à soi, […]” 
                                                
6 It is also entirely possible that this analysis prioritizes its own coherence by concretizing 
elements of the text left intentionally recondite. 
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(Mallarmé, 288). The infinity produced by such words in absentia is key to Mallarmé’s 
synthesis, which will be re-discussed at length shortly. 
 First though, a look at the two sides Mallarmé opposes: his thesis and antithesis. 
The first large section of “Le Mystère” details the opposed side, which is the side 
Mallarmé disdains. This opposing side constitutes the bad one. Recall Baudelaire’s 
similar use of this descriptor; much like Baudelaire’s critique’s social implications 
discussed above, Mallarmé, despite the “indifference” to which his essay refers, subtly 
(and not-so-subtly) moralizes his subjects. One side is bad, the other good. But the 
simplification this exegetical gesture in turn implies is very possibly only functional as 
regards the rhetorical nature of the present analysis. In opposing two critical modes – 
prose and poetry – this essay claims Mallarmé intends not simply to negate one in favor 
of the other, but to expand both, and expose both to the action of further critical 
discourse.  
 Ironically, Mallarmé reveals the difficulty in discussing these opposed sides to be 
the ease with which they are construed for each other:  
“Le débat — que l’évidence moyenne nécessaire dévie en un détail, reste de 
grammairiens. Même un infortuné se trompât-il à chaque occasion, la différence 
avec le gâchis en faveur couramment ne marque tant, qu’un besoin naisse de le 
distinguer de dénonciateurs : mais il récuse l’injure d’obscurité — pourquoi pas, 
parmi le fonds commun, d’autres d’incohérence, de rabâchage, de plagiat, sans 
recourir à quelque blâme spécial et préventif — ou encore une, de platitude ; mais 
celle-ci, personnelle, aux gens qui, pour décharger le public de comprendre, les 
premiers simulent l’embarras.” (Mallarmé, 287)  
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This paragraph describes the complicating paradox at the heart of said opposition in 
twisting, often maddening, detail. Notice foremost that the text acknowledges “the 
debate,” but proceeds immediately to disclaim it, suggesting it lie solely with 
“grammarians.” For the relegation of a word to the world of mere usage – the 
grammarian this world’s archetype – is insulting. And yet, the complexity of the debate 
itself is then described in full, grammatical detail. This grammar also implies further the 
moralizing polemic mentioned above.  
 Note that Mallarmé here refers to his aforementioned “contemporaries” as “le 
gâchis en faveur couramment.” The troubling aspect of this opposition is thus tethered to 
a notion of the popular and current, like in Baudelaire. This current “gâchis” is troubling 
in that “un infortuné” fails to grasp the difference between it and what Mallarmé’s 
polemic opposes it with. “L’obscurité” is thus an “insult” in the eyes of whatever this 
generally “current” might represent. That is, the goal of the “current” is comprehension, a 
base sentiment that Mallarmé’s polemic moralizes. Comprehension, like usage mentioned 
supra, is bad, in a removed, idealized sense. Rather than simplify his argument 
Mallarmé’s bad – much like Baudelaire’s – in fact complicates the meaning of “bad.” 
Thus when Mallarmé decribes the “fonds commun” of utter nonsense, the concepts of 
“obscurité” and “incoherence” are both negative as they define an opposed party, and 
positive – that is, good – as they define the remaining party he lauds. This “remaining 
party” – presumably the good one – deserves its own exegesis.  
 Mallarmé names the opposition in question at the beginning of “Le mystère”: “Si, 
tout de même, n’inquiétait je ne sais quel miroitement, en dessous, peu séparable de la 
surface concédée à la rétine — il attire le soupçon : les malins, entre le public, réclamant 
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de couper court, opinent, avec sérieux, que, juste, la teneur est inintelligible” (Mallarmé, 
281). Mallarmé reserves an unkind epithet for his foes: “les malins.” These individuals 
are “wily/cunning,” and what is more, “entre” the public, that is, “within/among” them. 
His foes are conspicuously denied the privileged removal of “le poëte,” mentioned later 
(282). Regardless of their lowly position within a public, the “malins” still possess the 
capacity to “cut short” that with which they engage – earlier called “tout écrit” (281) – 
rendering it finally “unintelligible” to the public they cunningly influence. These 
“malins” thus possess a definite critical capacity. In “cutting short,” they in fact judge. 
The essay claims this judgment renders incomprehensibility incomprehensible, much like 
the passage mentioned supra toward the essay’s close, where the very same critics, who, 
“pour décharger le public de comprendre, les premiers simulent l’embarras” (287). In 
order to understand the implications of this opposition, consider these “malins” or “gens” 
generally representative of “current” critical discourse. Remember though that as 
discourse, it does not distinguish between the people that write/speak it and the words 
that are written/spoken.  
 Another important passage evokes the “dessein avéré propre” (282) of the same 
critical discourse, further claiming “ils agissent peu délicatement, en précipitant à pareil 
accès la Foule (où inclus le Génie) que de déverser, dans un chahut, la vaste 
incompréhension humaine.” (282-3). Here, “la Foule” is the public and “le Génie” the 
poet. Notice that capitalization of the first letter enshrine’s these terms’ generality. The 
words are endowed with a supreme power to represent and symbolize, and the 
aforementioned “malins” wish to refuse the terms precisely this power. Yet it is revealed 
they wish to refuse said power because of the disastrous possibility of realizing “la vaste 
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incompréhension humaine.” This phrase is striking because of what it is not. Rather than 
ponder the extreme depth of human comprehension – the extent of a general human 
knowledge indeed vast – the text insists upon the negation of said comprehension: human 
incomprehension. Petty popular critics thus prevent incomprehension from bearing 
creative fruit by denouncing it, and stopping incomprehension’s revelation short.  
 And yet, as in the aforementioned example, Mallarmé follows by negating the 
very negation he just called for: “À propos de ce qui n’importait pas” (Mallarmé, 283). 
This phrase is troubling, for it seemingly prevents the scandal articulated supra – a refusal 
to engage with un-knowing/-knowledge – itself from bearing creative fruit, just like “le 
débat” unfortunately relegated to “grammariens.” Mallarmé defines this scandal – a 
debate between thesis and antithesis – with his customary separated paragraphs and traits 
longs: “Le scandale quoique représentatif, s’ensuit, hors rapport — / Quant à une 
entreprise, qui ne compte pas, littérairement — / La leur — ” (283). Once again, the 
argument – a “scandal” no less – articulated at length is subsequently called “hors 
rapport.” In this instance, the argument is further denounced – that is, undone – because it 
“does not count literarily.” Possession of this literarily insignificant enterprise? Theirs. 
The fundamental opposition – thesis vs. antithesis, mine vs. theirs – is here articulated, as 
before, both visually and rhetorically. The “banalité” of the “immediate” (283), as 
Mallarmé distinguishes “their” enterprise, is thus starkly opposed to presumably his own.  
 “Le Mystère dans les lettres” formally articulates its thesis by defining the party 
opposed to Mallarmé’s own in this way. It is possible that by pointing out this formal 
articulation, the present analysis lessens its efficacy and makes it banal. But the text 
complicates its own formal articulation by already having pointed to its banality. As a 
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result, it negates the very depth of exegetical scope it seems to warrant. That is, sufficient 
analysis of this text – an analysis sufficient for comprehension – necessarily reduces it. 
Yet the text itself could also be said to deny this reduction, linking it with the opposed 
party it denounces at length. Understanding what good the text presents thus necessitates 
engaging with the bad it also defines. The text’s actual goal – the goal that exists “sous le 
text” (288) – is to foster awareness of precisely this paradox. The text, like Baudelaire’s, 
uses irony in order to redefine the critical propensity in language. 
 How then to define the text’s antithesis? Characteristically, the antithesis follows 
a large break in the text; a white void momentarily dominates the eye.7 Defined initially 
and visually by its white boundary, the antithesis assumes the terse, open-ended syntax of 
its aforementioned thesis: “La Musique, à sa date, est venue balayer cela—” (284). 
Notice first that “music” is capitalized, removing it to the plane of generality toward 
which much of this essay gestures. Having been capitalized, it also further denotes its 
own intrinsic formal (and visual) articulation. Music as a general category thus stands in 
opposition to the limiting, comprehensible and equally general category of criticism 
defined initially (thesis). Notice second that Music performs a metaphorical task. That is, 
Music does not actually sweep anything up. Rather, the words evoke implied meaning by 
analogy, further defining Music’s relationship to their so-called “enterprise.” The fact 
that music “sweeps up” this enterprise implies that it is literally a mess. The image is 
strikingly clear. Notice also that the text evokes this image in one word: “balayer.” This 
is a powerful word because it immediately and convincingly refers to an image beyond 
itself. This reference beyond is precisely the “envol tacite d’abstration” (285) Mallarmé’s 
                                                
7 Although this “void” will ironically be shown to symbolize quite the opposite: it both articulates 
and performs the text’s synthesis, an analysis that concludes the essay. 
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text suggests Music so successfully exemplifies. He defines Music as his argument’s 
antithesis – the opposite of current criticism – in a careful assemblage of beautiful prose 
that closely resembles poetry: “Au cours, seulement, du morceau, à travers des voiles 
feints, ceux encore quant à nous-mêmes, un sujet se dégage de leur successive stagnance 
amassée et dissoute avec art — / Disposition l’habituelle” (284). “Faint veils” 
immediately suggests themes of limpidity and effacement in Mallarmé’s poetry; think 
“Une dentelle s’abolit…” or “Éventail de Madame Mallarmé.” They also elicit what Poe 
calls the “poetic sentiment” (Poe, 184) by evoking potent images that refer immediately 
beyond the text. These images represent the presence of metaphor, a device this essay 
claims Mallarmé reinvigorates in “Le Mystère." That is, his poetic diction revivifies the 
referential devices of metaphor and analogy by performing their liberation in the context 
of the essay. The radical extent of this liberation will become clear.  
 Another important passage must first be discussed in relation to the thesis-
antithesis debate. Music in this passage is defined as precisely the incomprehensible 
mystery toward which all text must gesture. In order to justify this definition, the text 
evokes powerful, moving imagery: “Les déchirures suprêmes instrumentales […] éclatent 
plus véridiques, à même, en argumentation de lumière, qu’aucun raisonnement tenu 
jamais : on s’interroge, par quels termes du vocabulaire sinon dans l’idée, en écoutant, les 
traduire, à cause de cette vertu incomparable” (Mallarmé, 285). Once again, Mallarmé’’s 
dialectic asserts itself as opposition. The text opposes the beauty of “déchirures suprêmes 
instrumentales” – another striking image – with the banality of “reason.” As a result, the 
term “véridiques” appears ironic, like in Baudelaire, when he denounces scholarly jargon 
that instantiates its own validity by claiming its own truth. Notice the text performs the 
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same ironicization of “termes du vocabulaire,” which appears frail and measly in the face 
of a concept like Music. Even ideas fail to adequately capture Music’s “virtue,” another 
term charged with significant moral implication. Thus Music – antithesis – defines what 
is good in relation to an initial – thesis – bad. Note that “good” is again thoroughly 
complicated by its analogic (that is, with Music) lack of definition . Mallarmé admires 
music for precisely this indefiniteness and inherent abstraction, which his text argues the 
written word must emulate.  
 His polemic’s dialectical antithesis points toward its own synthesis, concluding: 
“L’écrit, envol tacite d’abstraction, reprend ses droits en face de la chute des sons nus : 
tous deux, Musique et lui, intimant une préalable disjonction, celle de la parole, 
certainement par effroii de fournir au bavardage” (Mallarmé, 285). Music is shown to 
exist entirely within its own analogic form. As this polemic’s antithesis, Music suggests a 
dialectic within Letters.8 Here “l’ecrit” (written word) defends itself from “la parole” 
(spoken word), which represents the “horror” of lowly “chit-chat,” by abstracting itself – 
just like Music (note the analogy). Imagine that: chit-chat is not just bad, it’s something 
feared. This ardent opposition suggests profoundly polemical critique. And yet, in an 
ironic turn, the antithetical opposition of Music criticizes the very criticism that relegated 
its antithesis to a fringe position in the first place. The text actually performs the irony of 
a critique of criticism by showing that words successfully criticize themselves through 
their own self-abstraction. Mallarmé also performs his polemic’s synthesis, claiming “Les 
mots, d’eux-mêmes, s’exaltent à mainte facette produite la plus rare ou valant pour 
l’esprit, centre du suspens vibratoire […]” (286-287). The entirety of the polemic is thus 
                                                
8 This term implies a reference to the essay’s title – “[…] dans les lettres [emphasis mine]” – 
while referring to the totality of written word, as in the phrase, “a man of letters.” 
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relegated to the “many facets” of words themselves. That is, the debate is thus removed 
from the contextual and placed within the textual.  
 Mallarmé’s insistence on “La Syntaxe —” (286) as a moment of “pivot” (note 
again the punctuationally explicit articulation of form) – that is, a “garantie” understood 
even by those aforementioned and deplorable “grammariens” (287) – appears to 
contradict its own analogy with Music. And yet, through the conscious application of 
artistic choice, even that which appears to “guarantee” comprehension (that is, 
intelligibility) can show its façade of reliable function to be cracked: “Un balbutiement, 
que semble la phrase, ici refoulé dans l’emploi d’incidentes multiple, se compose et 
s’enlève en quelque équilibre supérieur, à balancement prévu d’inversions” (286). The 
striking complexity of this sentence is overwhelming. Yet the text aids in its own 
comprehension by performing this “stammering.” Consider the text’s second paragraph 
mentioned supra, redacted in order to better convey grammatical meaning. Now examine 
the full sentence, which ripples with contingent and grammatically vertiginous phraselets: 
“Tout écrit, extérieurement à son trésor, doit, par égard envers ceux dont il emprunte, 
après tout, pour un objet autre, le langage, présenter, avec les mots, un sens même 
indifferent […]” (281). Reading this sentence aloud is performing it, delivering it, as if a 
line in a play; it becomes the “balbutiement” described above as “équilibre supérieur, à 
balancement prévu d’inversions.” Once again, comprehending this phrase involves 
reduction, performed in the present analysis by the redacted version supra; ironically, 
Mallarmé’s text decries precisely this reduction in contemporary criticism.  
 Yet criticism can also be shown to expand what it criticizes, to further the text’s 
“envol tacite” (285) from itself. “Le Mystère” exemplifies referential and expansive 
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criticism best at the moment of synthesis presupposed by its polemical form: “Lire— ” 
(287). But this gesture is more than the synthesis of Mallarmés self-annulling dialectic. 
Considering Music’s transcendent role in the text, “Lire—” as word must also be heard. 
Its separation from the words surrounding it emphasizes its heard quality. Recall 
discussion of the term “reading” in this essay when used to describe an analytical gesture. 
In this instance, the term appears doubly meaningful. “Lire—” is “read” meaning 
interpreted, and “read” meaning performed, spoken like a line in a play. The word as 
sonic structure further suggests its homophones. Consider the French homophone “lyre,” 
a musical instrument associated with Apollo and the Arts. Through analogy, this term 
evokes inspiration, creation, emotion and performance, though note that the analogy is 
internal, meaning the word evokes its own analogic reading. The trait long that defines 
this word’s graphic gesture becomes the lyre’s string, visually articulating the “centre du 
suspens vibratoire” (287) present in every word. This central suspense vibrates with 
possibility, the possibility of an infinity of readings, an infinity of analyses, a critical 
mode that embraces this infinity by avoiding the popular tendency to reduce meaning into 
comprehensible and inoffensive spoonfuls.  
 Mallarmé concludes his essay – and the sentence he begins with “Lire—” – by 
implicating the infinity of the blank page, as hinted at supra: “[…] Appuyer, selon la 
page, au blanc, qui l’inaugure, son ingénuité, à soi, oublieuse même du titre qui parlerait 
trop haut : […]” (288). Pause here to consider the radical nature of this complete 
attribution of subjectivity to words themselves; the page, the white, inaugurates, 
according to its own taste, its own ingenuity. It forgets its own title, as the title of 
Mallarmé’s essay refers to the Letters that in turn forget it (see supra). The sentence 
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continues: “et, quand s’aligna, dans une brisure, la moindre, disséminée, le hasard vaincu 
mot par mot, indéfectiblement le blanc revient, tout à l’heure gratuit, certain maintenant, 
pour conclure que rien au-delà et authentiquer le silence —” (288). The page’s white 
remains certain, its silence authenticated. What the text as “brisure” refers to only 
intimates a possibility, an infinity of reference beyond itself.  
 Ironically, “Le Mystère” uses words in order to suggest the impossibility of their 
use. Like Baudelaire, the critical act is key, yet Mallarmé’s critique approaches poetry in 
that it ironically performs the poetical multiplication of meaning it attempts to define. 
Ironic again is that this multiplication is defined by its indefinability, that is, its 
incomprehensibility. Ironic yet again is that words themselves manufacture both this 
definition and in-definition. In that Mallarmé emphasizes “L’air ou chant sous le texte 
[…]” (288) above all else, his essay suggests a reassessment of Baudelaire’s and Poe’s 
respective texts. Mallarmé suggests criticism – good criticism – must consider both what 
is present and what isn’t, or rather what those words that are present define in their lack. 
Just as the self-annulling dialectic of Mallarmé’s essay ironically opens its own internally 
negative irony to a constant and self-perpetuating rebirth – a kind of miraculous 
“virginité” (288) – it also manages to reclaim analogy as device – a device so easily 
muddied by and confused with the nonsense of a “fonds commun” (287) – for poetical 
“divination” (288). The importance of this reclaiming through negation, the emphasis on 
what lies beneath – this “cul-de-lampe invisible” (288) – is masterfully articulated and 
performed in the poem of Mallarmé’s mentioned supra as well. This poem is important, 
as mentioned, precisely because it refers beyond itself to the works of Poe and Baudelaire 
also discussed supra. 
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 Mallarmé’s essay reclaims for poetry the analogy as poetical “device” (although 
forever a device of the most rarified sort, a device against all devices, an un-device); his 
prose-poem “Le Démon de l’analogie” then performs this reclaim. That being said, as 
was shown supra, “Le Mystère dans les lettres” does a fine and subtle job of performing 
its own exegesis – its own reclaim – thereby denying and undoing it. The current analysis 
suggests that the two – prose-poem and essay – relate to each other along this analogic 
axis, which means that the two support each other. If the essay poeticizes image, the 
poem then imagizes poetry. While the apparent polarization of rhetorical reversal might 
seem to simplify, it is meant to imply that the two pieces also complicate each other. “Le 
Démon” and “Le Mystère” essentially do the same work. The difference is that the two 
operate according to the sides they oppose respectively, thereby using the other as 
analogy in order to criticize it. “Le Démon de l’analogie” is then the poem to which “Le 
Mystère” refers, a poem that always and already criticizes itself. Likewise, “Le Mystère” 
is the analysis “Le Démon” demands, that is, an analysis that always and already points 
to its own insufficiency, the insufficiency of analysis in general.  
 How is it “Le Démon de l’analogie” evokes this analogy? From the first stanza of 
“Démon,” the narrator – who, as in Poe and Baudelaire, also subversively symbolizes the 
story’s author – solidifies the role of “la parole” (spoken word) in the poem as 
antagonist: “Des paroles inconnues chantèrent-elles sur vos lèvres, lambeaux maudits 
d'une phrase absurde ?” (85). “Words” are inherently “foreign,” no more than the “cursed 
tatters” of an “absurd sentence.” Notice, though, that these words are spoken, and recall 
the dialectical opposition highlighted by polemic in “Le Mystère”: spoken vs. written; 
critical vs. musical; good vs. bad. The “word” here is important also in that it refers to all 
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words, constituting synecdoche. In this way it suggests the “generality” that Mallarmé 
also emphasizes in his essay. This general character is also extremely important because 
it directly refers to the opening of Poe’s “The Imp of the Perverse” and Baudelaire’s “Le 
Mauvais vitrier.” The general, theoretical tone that characterizes these stories’ openings 
is mirrored in Mallarmé’s own. The difference in Mallarmé is his emphasis on reduction. 
What was in Poe extremely prolix, and Baudelaire slightly less so, is in Mallarmé 
accomplished in one sentence. And a question no less. The interrogatory formula also 
simultaneously refers to the questions that end Poe’s and Baudelaire’s respective stories, 
and whose comparison revealed so much about their interrelated modes of meaning 
making. By commencing with an interrogation turned inward, Mallarmé further 
emphasizes the extent to which the “words” of his poem are understood as interrogating 
first and foremost themselves. Beginning the poem with this interrogatory reference 
emphasizes its circularity yet again. 
 Another important aspect of this analogy is that it is semi-anthropomorphized, 
turned into an instrument that is in turn anthropomorphized as it “sings” across “lips.” 
The musical analogy with “singing” resonates throughout the poem, a kind of refrain that 
will be shown to become haunting and eerie as it steadily drives the narrator toward 
insanity. Like Poe’s “Imp,” responsible for inciting in its literary victim the predilection 
for perversity that leads to the predicament detailed by the story, Mallarmé’s musical 
analogy is demonic because it persists, despite its inherent potential for meaninglessness. 
This maddening potential is referred to in the story as “le vide de signification” 
(Mallarmé, 86), an incredibly important phrase because it simultaneously conjures the 
potential for meaning symbolized by blank emptiness – recall Mallarmé’s insistence “au 
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blanc” (288) at the end of “Le Mystère” – and its own purported lack of meaning using 
analogy.  
 And yet, the analogy connecting words and music is incredibly important to 
Mallarmé’s polemic in “Le Mystère.” Recall that Mallarmé’s synthetic argument hinges 
on an analogic relation between the Written and Music, toward which all Spoken word 
must in turn aspire: “L’écrit […] prend […] ses droits en face de la chute des sons nus : 
tous deux, Musique et lui, intiment une disjonction, celle de la parole, certainement par 
horreur de fournir au bavardage” (285). Once again, though, this analogy (as discussed 
above in “Le Démon”) is complicated by its own potential for meaninglessness. The 
poem’s narrator, for whom this analogy is important, is horrified by his own ability to 
perceive the analogy’s linguistic inanity at the same time as its infinity of reference. The 
richness of his understanding of written word as music is rendered false and empty by its 
own rhetorical construction, yet infinitely self-multiplying by the analogy that defines it.  
 Also key to an understanding of the use of analogy in “Le Démon” is its “absurd 
phrase” (Mallarmé, 85) to which it refers, and which seems in context a non sequitur. As 
a result, the poem’s purported plot (albeit an utterly abstruse one) involves the narrator’s 
coming to terms with the implications of this phrase, that is, his own emotional analysis 
of it. This phrase, “La pénultième / est morte” (286), is emphasized in the body of the 
story’s text much the same way those purportedly formal attributes are emphasized in 
“Le Mystère.” It occupies space, surrounded by the blank page so pregnant (or perhaps 
“Virgin” [288]) with meaning. The myriad potential for meaning in this sentence is also 
enhanced by its self-referential nature. The penultimate syllable to which the narrator 
refers, that is, “la penultième” itself, is “nul.” This “nul” both sounds like “nul,” meaning 
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“nothing,” and is in fact “nul,” that is, it means nothing outside its discursive context. 
Thus the absurd sentence referred to in the opening stanza becomes a linguistic Möbius 
strip that inherently and perpetually refers to nothing more than itself.  
 Yet as Möbius strip, it refers to a plethora of meanings and references beyond 
itself. It’s own critical inward turn opens it up to a vast array of meanings that frighten 
the narrator as he is forced to imagine them. Consider the visual way the word’s accent 
grave and accent aigu point back and toward each other, implying an arc that visually 
enacts the word’s Möbius strip quality, while at the same time centralizing the 
penultimate syllable, “nul.” That said, the word’s visual symbol comprises yet another 
aspect of the varied, moving, and pointing repertoire of symbolic gesture to which 
Mallarmé suggests with “Le Démon” every word – written and spoken – is subject. Even 
the physical construction of a word, its visual impact, cannot escape analogy’s demon.  
 Recall Mallarmé’s similar visual and rhetorical emphasis on “Lire—” during the 
synthesis of his polemic in “Le Mystère.” The word “lire” is important precisely because 
of its reduction, its lack of grammatically normalizing context, which in turn ordains the 
consideration of all this lack symbolizes. In “Le Démon” Mallarmé does something 
similar by representing the cursed phrase visually in the text, physically detached and yet 
self-referentially complete. Its words in this context assume a texture of meaning that 
cannot be avoided. The words as written become objects, artifacts just like the antique 
instruments that themselves become objects at the poem’s conclusion. This 
transformation will be examined shortly. 
 The dénouement “Le Démon’s” arcane “plot” subtly points to occurs in the prose-
poem’s final paragraph, when the narrator looks up to find himself physically amongst 
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the objects of analogy he earlier fancied, as result of the demonic phrase, “descending” 
(Mallarmé, 86) upon him:  
“Mais où s'installe l'irrécusable intervention du surnaturel, et le commencement 
de l'angoisse sous laquelle agonise mon esprit naguère seigneur c'est quand je vis, 
levant les yeux, dans la rue des antiquaires instinctivement suivie, que j'étais 
devant la boutique d'un luthier vendeur de vieux instruments pendus au mur, et, à 
terre, des palmes jaunes et les ailes enfouies en l'ombre, d'oiseaux anciens.” 
(Mallarmé, 87) 
The ancient stringed instruments that were before only analogy – “Je fis des pas dans la 
rue et reconnus en le son nul la corde tendue de l'instrument de musique, qui était oublié 
[…]” (86) - now hang on the walls of a shop, the yellow palm leaves and wings of 
ancient birds buried in shadow – “[…] et que le glorieux Souvenir certainement venait de 
visiter de son aile ou d'une palme et, le doigt sur l'artifice du mystère […]” (86) – now on 
the ground before him, part of some carpet or inlay. The sudden and unanticipated 
congruity of analogous and real – the contemporaneity of thought and seen – is 
unbearable to the narrator because it somehow represents – for it cannot “verify,” which 
term Mallamré deftly criticizes in “Le Mystère” – the horror of the paradox he recognized 
early in the story with regard to the absurd sentence itself: namely, that in its own self-
annulment, this phrase actually reveals an infinity of analogous tangents, which persist 
indefinitely.  
 Interestingly, the melancholy and confusion the narrator experiences as result of 
his epiphany contrasts with the beauty of the analogies the phrase initially elicits. As the 
prose-poem progresses, the infinity of meaning self-annulment gestures to becomes 
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increasingly clear to the narrator. Rather than serenade, the phrase begins to “torment” 
(Mallarmé, 87): “Harcelé, je résolus de laisser les mots de triste nature errer eux-mêmes 
sur ma bouche, et j'allai murmurant avec l'intonation susceptible de condoléance” 
(Mallarmé, 87). With the infinite potential for recurrence finally symbolized by 
reification, the narrator seems to lose himself utterly, calling himself “condamnée à porter 
probablement le deuil de l'inexplicable Pénultième” (Mallarmé, 87). His epiphany is so 
troubling that it elicits the admittedly strange though somehow compelling response of 
just fleeing: “Je m'enfuis, bizarre […]” (Mallarmé, 87). Note the extreme compression of 
this phraselet. All grammatical filler is removed in favor of the discord created at the 
junction of verb and adjective. But the question remains: how can one “flee” words, 
escape their omnipresence and omnipotence? “Le Démon” as poem asks this very 
question; “Le Mystère” as essay asks it as well. The “answer” involves the double kind of 
irony noted in “Le Mystère.” Much as “Le Mystère” criticizes critique using words in 
turn critical of themselves, “Le Démon” refers to reference using words that in turn refer 
to themselves, the referential act understood to be one of analogy. 
 What is perhaps most important is the nature of this irony as element in “Le 
Démon.” Like the discussion of Baudelaire’s “Le Mauvais vitrier” suggests supra, this 
irony is complex and richly emotional, so much so that an inability to grapple with its 
rich emotionality elicits the narrator’s bizarre flight at the poem’s conclusion. He simply 
does not know how to respond to so much complex irony. His moving (that is, emotional) 
response is concretized ironically by the prose-poem, in which the narrator ambles 
continuously from beginning to end. He is always moving, while the infinity of meaning 
he contemplates is always moving as well. This is a prime example of the poem’s power 
  
72 
to suggest multiple meanings within itself. The narrator’s movement, like the capacity for 
analogy, is somehow “instinctively followed” (Mallarmé, 87), yet this instinctive 
movement has no clear direction or aim, which is what frightens the narrator. The lack of 
directionality constitutes a lack, while simultaneously projecting in its lack an infinity of 
possible directions.  
 The emotionality associated with the narrator’s epiphany and attempted escape is 
mirrored throughout the text, and, as in Baudelaire, it begins to take on a critically 
moralizing air. Consider this sentence, which immediately refers to both Baudelaire’s 
disdain for academic discourse, and Mallarmé’s injurious claim about “grammarians”:  
“Je ne discontinuai pas de tenter un retour à des pensées de prédilection, 
alléguant, pour me calmer, que, certes, pénultième est le terme du lexique qui 
signifie l'avant-dernière syllabe des vocables, et son apparition, le reste mal abjuré 
d'un labeur de linguistique par lequel quotidiennement sanglote de s'interrompre 
ma noble faculté poétique.” (Mallarmé, 87) 
The “quotidian” tasks of “linguistics” are reduced to mere “labor.” In contrast, the 
“poetic faculty” is elevated to the plane of the “noble.” This diametric opposition is 
Baudelaireian in its ironic application of moral value. Can the poetic as a faculty that 
crumbles beneath an old string instrument be rightly called “noble”? The tragedy is here 
ironic; a Poeian inability to control the perverse auto-reflection that necessarily 
accompanies any kind of self-aware meaning making – analogy construction – freezes the 
artist in his tracks. This tragedy still suggests what Mallarmé gestures toward as good in 
“Le Mystère” – an emphasis on those constructions that permit an infinity of 
interpretation over simplification via reduction to lowly coherence. As in Baudelaire, an 
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ethics of creativity is both proposed and critiqued. The power of this moralization as 
clarified by Mallarmé’s “Le Mystère” in relation to “Le Démon” can be further viewed as 
analogous – including analogy’s infinite tangential meanings – to the relationship 
between Baudelaire’s “Notes nouvelles” and “Le Mauvais vitrier.” The sets of works 
complete each other respectively, while further permitting a more meaningful – that is, 
more tangential – interpretation of the other author’s set. 
 And yet, in the face of meaning’s potential, the virgin’s nuptial potential, the 
confounding potential of the “Idea,” (Mallarmé, 288), irony persists: ironic that the very 
words used at the behest of the story itself simultaneously communicate their own 
incomprehensibility, pointing to a reading’s own perverse potential to render the story 
itself meaningless, simply a string of sonic chatter, nothing more than its own style of 
assembled pitch and rhythm. As intended, the possibility for comprehension is perched 
precariously; the poem’s true plot reveals itself: what is at stake is not just the narrator’s 
ability to comprehend, but comphrehension itself. And it teeters at the very point where it 
simultaneously renders itself impossible: words themselves. The story is interstitial – 
recall the “brisure” from which “le blanc revient” (Mallarmé, 288) – in that it occupies a 
kind of potentiality of infinite comprehension. It operates simultaneously, jumping 
according to a reading’s intent, rather than its own. Irony again: this ceding of analogy, 
this renunciation, is in turn a locus of meaning, which is the story’s power: in referring, it 
refers away from itself in order to augment itself – it refers while remaining anti-
referential – it constitutes the infinity it mourns.   
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Conclusion 
 The conclusion the above essay necessitates necessarily does not conclude. It is 
an anti-conclusion. Referring to themselves by referring to each other, the texts discussed 
point to a referential multiplicity of meaning – both a physical void and implied infinity – 
beyond themselves, an infinity no conclusion could possibly use words to delimit (that is, 
describe). An anti-conclusion points at this infinity. By pointing, it paradoxically raises 
more questions than it answers. But it raises questions of particular importance, namely: 
how does one reconcile language’s desire to communicate with the damage 
communication does poetry as ideal? The present analysis asked this very question in 
reference to Poe, Baudelaire, and Mallarmé, but it did not offer a satisfying answer. 
Unfortunately, its conclusion won’t offer one either. The texts mentioned seek to resolve 
conflict in this question themselves by first aggravating it; they also suggest that the 
question’s insidious quality lies in its ability to conceal itself in discourse. The question, 
like Mallarmé’s “cursed phrase” thus answers itself by being asked. These texts suggest 
the question is a self-referential one par excellence. Its best answer, the answer that does 
the very work the question necessitates, is the question’s own restatement.  
 By revealing how critical discourse – its rhetorical form – prevents the question 
mentioned from being asked, the three poets discussed criticize not only poetry’s descent 
into the quotidian, but also the elevation and near-apotheosis of critique itself. The 
present essay aimed to show this “critique of critique” to be ironic because of its inherent 
paradox. Another important question thus asks itself: how can critical language be critical 
of critique? That is, how can critical discourse successfully serve its own annulment? 
Again, rather than answer this question, the texts mentioned answer it by asking it. They 
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answer this question by performing it. Rather than explicitly answer, these texts use 
critical language to critique critical language, thereby necessitating a statement of the 
question in response to it. I would that, like Baudelaire suggests regarding Poe, this ironic 
gesture is not without “une légère impertinence.” In that the present essay showed how 
such a meta-critical usage annuls itself, it points to the meta-irony of the three authors’ 
use of irony. But it is perhaps worth concluding this essay by acknowledging that the 
three authors get the last laugh. 
  The present essay’s discussion of Mallarmé in particular acknowledges their 
laugh. Mallarmé answers both of the questions asked in this conclusion by showing them 
to both reveal and subvert the same ultimate opposition. In analyzing Mallarmé’s 
answers, this essay suggested he, like Baudelaire and Poe, moralized his opposition so as 
to clarify it. That is, whether rhetorical language is ultimately proven bad or poetical 
language good, their polemical opposition is most important because it fosters dialectic. 
The conversation between these two sides answers the question of their opposition while 
multiplying the implications of the very same question. The ability to ask more questions 
is thus shown in Mallarmé to be the ultimate goal of any worthwhile critique – that is, 
questioning itself. Restoring language’s “mystery” thus constitutes an emphasis on 
question over answer. Note that pitting question against answer conforms in an 
interesting and subversive way to the same moralized opposition deduced in Mallarmé. I 
would suggest that a restoration of mystery is shown by Mallarmé, Baudelaire and Poe to 
involve precisely the question that always and forever asks another as its answer. Thus 
the best question – the only question – is the question that questions questioning. 
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 If this essay is critical of a critique of critical language, it also inevitably renders 
itself meaningless. A confounding multiplication of the question asked supra presents 
itself. This confounding multiplication frightens. Mallarmé suggests this when the 
narrator of “Le Démon de l’analogie” “flees, bizarre.” I would suggest the present 
analysis performed this frightening multiplicity by questioning more than answering. Yet 
the provocative spirals of self-/critical discourse also answer the infinite questioning of 
meta-critique. Critical language is only successful in that it is constantly and infallibly 
critical. The only critical language is the language that, while recognizing its self-
referential capacity, is never content with itself. Thus, the present conclusion constitutes a 
critique of the essay it concludes. For, despite the fact this essay asks how critical 
language can criticize critique, it employs the very same critical rhetoric it annuls by 
asking. Note that the word “criticize” implies it makes something critical; the act of 
criticizing inevitably also makes what it refers to critical of itself. If this essay was 
successful, it includes the key to its own critique. I would suggest that, in discussing Poe, 
Baudelaire and Mallarmé, the present essay justifies its own self-/critique. 
 A question asked in the essay proper bears repeating: how can one escape words? 
That is, how can language – words themselves – escape the words that delimit (describe) 
it? The textual relationship between Poe, Baudelaire and Mallarmé suggest the only 
conceivable answer to involve the renunciation of escape’s possibility. To reveal the 
beauty hidden in language – to preserve it by revealing it – is to engage language head-
on. Since escape is not an option, the protection of language’s beauty involves constant 
and radical protest. In concluding, the present essay can only aspire to have joined in this 
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protest – to have taken part in the very protest Poe, Baudelaire and Mallarmé – internally 
and in relation to one another – always and forever incite.   
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